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draftocl for tasks in another roglon,
:< Division nnder the XXXXIII Corps on 30 Juno 19i3
ronortocl s
in.^
_ _''^ P '^^ Z.
now aid no^ ^uoplonentary
for hoav^ £'^i^£LP£^Sl
Gspocially since Hus£ian_civ_ilj^ans__r.ro
";arGady,_it haoponod^that civiliar
as_^it-.n£d_to f or tif a^t^on ^ork_v;ho up ^ (
bGin£^ a_s_si£nQc._for labor r 0£;ard3.G£S_of
¥h_eir £h£sic£l_fj.tnGS_SjJ^ Xoiephasis supplied)
On 5 January 194d the 5rd fanzor ..rny issuod a diroctlve
for. its Corps Hoadquartors and Roar -*roa which statod:
":ai porscns capable of carrying arr.is
and ablG to- v/ork nust bo seizod for t^G
allocrtion of lo.bor. That is to
gonoral, a.11 r.ion and worien, ago 14 to 5o.
v
m
\
It s.ppoars boyon question that ;r:on and vvonon and even
childron were draftod for work and that thoy woro usoa.in
tho rjciin front lino. One order says they are to bo sholtcred
and fod and' another that tho;/ shall bo usoc. rutnlossly
and if tho situation pernits, in the front linos also, ^
/mother report shov/a that ''the allocation of ontiro
fariilios for fortification construction near the front
lino mot vfith difficulties".
1/Vo are convinced by tho docui'nonts and tho tostlnony
in tho caso that in the area of Eoinhardt*s army, emorcoa
labor by the civilians v/as carried out as a policy and '
that it \va.s implemented ruthlossly v/ith Roinhard.t's
knov/lod-co and consont, and ovon pursuant to his,o^'^G^s»
po£ortat_ion and Enslavor.;on^ £.•''£
r.oinhardt^a policy v:lth respoct to this m.attor is snov/n
"by an ordor slyuGd b-y hln as porirandor-in-ChiGi of tho 3rd
pansor -^rny to the effect that;
"Tho fuehrer has charged Gauloitor
Sauckol with'the direction of tho ontiro
labor allocation program reaching inho tho
•4" •
1
zono of oporr.tlons. An intolligont
cooperation of tho nilitrry voroncios
with tho dopr.rti.ients of tho lohor
allocation administro.tion must ma.hG
it possihlo to i'iobilizo tho worlr
capacity of tho entire ahlo bodiod
population. If success cannot be
achieved in any other vmy, coercive
iiicasuros must nov/ bo apeliod to
recruit tho roquirod labor for
allocation in the Reich#" (oripho.sis
supplied)
This ordor had wido distribution throughout his coriinavncl.
Having given such an ordor ho inust aseumo responsibility for
what was dono by his si\bordinate • units in rosponso
thoroto,
V/o find in tho rocordn a report from tho Secret
Field Police that a father mahing his way to tho partisans,
over tho objection of his children, v^r.s shot while so
doin^» Tho throe childron wore sent to Qornany to
work •
•'V
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Vihon tho ordor cn.r.:o clown from the OICH to clrnft the
ngo groups 1925 and 1926, Roinhordt*3 Chlof of S^-aff of tho
3rd Po.nzor ..rny gavo an ordor in which it Y*p.a specified;
"Beginning 3 .,ugust 1913 o. transport
train v/ith pastern v/orlcors v/ill "bo disxeatchod
each Tuesday and i^'riday from the army areo.
to tho Hoich«"
Tho proclaiuation sent out with thoso orders' stated that
nwhoevor tries to evade his service obligation will bo
severely punished, "
.1 report of 23 July 1913 reveals that a conference was
hold at the headquarters of tho 3rd Panzer -'.rny. This
docuioont is rather significant, notation of one of tho
raattors discussed is as follows;
cc). Severe Jmnctions against resistance
and ;bran^gro£s^on,
Transferring guilty persons t.-) tho SD?
(Lublin?)
Family members of persons liable to
service v/ho have escaped, to bo appre
hended without cjnsideration for personal
situation for labor allocation Reich;
howovor these are to bo cared for and
treated lilce thoso \/llling to v/orh,"
Three days after this conforcnce, the 3rd Panzer ^^.rny re
ported to the A^rriy Group Center. tronch<ant statonont
contained in that report is:
"Persons apprehended by force after
attempts to evade this draft at first
v/ill be sent to penal camps which must
bo run along strict lines,"
activity report of 1 J^ugust 1943 of the 3rd Panzer
hrmy with roforonco to tho labor com'ni'itment of tho civilian
population and particularly the 1925 and 1926 classes
statcb S
"The first batches of eastern v/orhors
for the Reich have been assigned to the
collection cary^s vjlthout use of unpleasant
measures. In some aroo.s about 50j of
tho persons subject to tho labor draft have
fled, possibly by v/ay of joining tho bands,"
20d- -
'. , w.'.L. u -lAij V,
ji'
1;
r:.ii
-4. notation under dr.to of 30 Octo'eor 1943 appears in
the V/ar Diary of the Third ?anzor —ray as follows:
"Mvr Bohnisch, Chief ,of the Lr.hor
Group of Econony Headquarters 206 in
Viitehsh, reoorts to 0 5 on the allocation
of his forces durin.^ the *Heinrich'
operation, and on the intended transport
of the civilians onanating (gonachten)
froa this onterprise. a.ll dersennol '
fit for nilitary service, and for \7orh,
v/ho are seized are to be sent to the
concentration caiaps of Lublin and
-uschwitz via the 5D car.ps and Dulag
125. In any case they riay not be tu.r;iod
over for free labor alloco.tion in the
Reich. . livr Bohnisch further reports that
in the rear area of the Ilnd Luftv/affo
Field Corps there are about 8000 newly
arrived civilians, and in the area of the
0.K. Schunilino about 3000. He ashs
for a decision whether any recruits
1.-iUy bo drawn fron these resettled
oorsons for Labor ..'^ullocrtion in the
Reich, .^tor being subr^ittod. to O.Lu.
this is autiiorizod, •but intonsivo re
cruiting in Litebsk, which according to
Lvr Behnisch's ooinion would produce 2-
3000 persons, is colryed. for the tine being."
This clearly disposes of any contontion that the ro-
cruitriont of those classes for labor in the Reich was on
any volimtciry basis. situation Report of the 3re ^anzor
..r-oy, dated 21 February 1944, notes:
"TTtnost seizure of all unoviployod and
able-bodied civilians still loitering
about, Rocontly ordered by Panzer--OR
3/ 0 Lu/Lu.2 dated 10 January 1944, Ho,
579/44 socrot."
Following this, on 4 ..prll, a report of the 3rd Panzer ^n^ny
shows that 11,000 from the ditebsk area were found fit for
X"bor assignacnt to the Loich and d.oported. The report
furthei' notes that there was a continuation of labor
o^QQlQ-oi'iont according to the i.iost recent draft of the order
concerning age groups, 1925-26.
The foregoing and other evidence in the record convince
us that the forcible conscription and illegal use of
civilians within the areas of Reinh'^rdt^s corv.vand was a
206
•'5A?
•M-,
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fixod policy. While ho and his witness os deny that
such a policy v/as in effect, wo find their tosttoony not
credible. Not only wore civilian workers conscripted
for use in the army areas but the orders and reports
cited, and others to which v/e havo not referred, shov/
clearly that the dopoftation of civilian workers to tho
Reich was of such long continued and general ijractico,
that oven wore there no orders signed by tho defendant
authorizing it, ho must be hold to havo had knowledge of
tho practice and of its extent, Tho record shows that
ho did nothing to hinder or prohibit tho practice, that
on tho contrary, ho encouraged '.nd carried it out in
the area of his connand.
Plunder and Spoliation
Tho evidence on tho matter of plunder and spoliation
shov/s great ruthlcssncss, but wo are not satisfied that
It shows beyond a reasonable doubt, acts that ^vore not '
justified by military necessity.
Murder, Ill-Troatmont and -^orsocutien
of Civilian Populations
Roinhardt passed on the Barbarossa Jurisdiction
Ord-or. On 25 February 1942, ho gave tho following
directions to his treopss
"6.) If vtfoapons i'.ro fomd in tho
possession of partisans or thoir partisan
activity scons quite obvious, the partisans
are to bo shot or hung by order if an
- 207
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officer^ and tho reasons nado public to
the population "by sor:iG suitable nannor
(for instance, a sirpi attached to tho
partisan v.'ith tho Inscription; *Tliis
is v/hat happens to ovoryono vdio fells
a tolo£:raph polo'). Sinilar tr3r.ti;ient
should bo given to inhabito.nts \/ho
support partisans."
This shows cloarly that in his area they ontondod tho
terns franc-tireur in o-ccordanco v/ith tho huoller dirccti-nis
at the 'warsav/ Gonforonco. The LIX —rny Corps c.nd Pansor
Group 3, anong other things, ordered:
"Tho holding of hostages nay be docnod
nocossary. If it is suSjpectcd that
roads or places are ninedj prisoners
of Y/ar or tho local population aro to
v/alk in front or clear tho i:iinos."
On 31 July 1942 FLeinh.Tdt signed an order \7hich, a:-.iong
other things, stated; "tho death sentence nay bo inposod
on every 10th nan if tho ring loader or tho espocially
guilty persons cannot be a:;prohonded," ?Io states further
in the order that every officer or Field police Officio.l
(not auxiliary polico official) is conpetont to nairo
the decision, and aftor careful exariinatim, thrt such
officor shall ordor tho oxocutions (shooting or hanging),
ordor signed by Keitol on 16 Docor.ibor 1942 providod
"The trooDs cro theroforo ohtitlod and
oven obliged to G;:';,ploy whatever noahs
in this fight v/ithout any restraint, also
against women and children, as long as
it loads to success."
Thl3 ordor was sent dovm to subordinate units by tho 3rd
pans or ..rmy on 5 JanYxary 1943 and v/as carried out with
ruthlGssnoss. Roinhardt says his chief of staff transnittod
this during his absence, but throughout the trial it lias
boon tho contention of tho dofonso that tho chief of
staff took no authority In natters of policy -nd did not
sign orders xinless ho Icnoxv that they v/ere in conforxiilty
v;ith the will of tho connandor. ^•/o think that is what
- 208 -
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occurred in this caso. If the ordor vms not in conforaity
v/ith his policy, ho should havo repudiated it, Reinhardt
says ho did not return to this soctor but there can be
no question that ho ^returned to his .cdmand and v;o havo no
doubt he learned v/hat his chief of staff had dono In
hiS"-absence o
The 3rd Panzer -'..rniy on 30 March 1943 passed on an OlMI
order in which it is provided that band supporters and band
suspects are to be handodi over to the Senior S3 and Polico
Leader i^or transfer to a concentration caop ''providing
they havo not boon shot lioioodiatoly, respoctivoly hun^;;,
or in specio-l cases assigned to the corfoatting of bands
according to Section 11 of the Circular." fho XX^CCIII
-^.rny Corps under date of 29 L.arch 1943, suggoatod to the
3rd Panzor ..riirj- the following:
, "when in band-lnfestod areas, v/horo
the bulk of the bands consists of forcibly
rocruited persons, bandits nro publicly
hanged or shot, it must bo considered
that these forcibly reci^uited people, if
only for fear of a siroll^.r fate, v/ill
be induced to offer the nost active
resistance to the troops napping up. If,
tliGroforG, it Is not succoGdod in olinln^ting
tho bandits in:.:odiatGly on tho battle
passed on fron nouth to 'Ootith, and tho
nunbor of deserters v/ill grow in spite
of tho active countor-pro'paganda • of the
cora.iissars. It loay bo advisable, for
propaganda reasons, to dross up sone
bandit as a nenbor of an East unit or of
indigenous auxiliary police (CD), under
inconspicums biit strict guard, and to
show hin very c.jnSj.ncuQUsly to tho
popul'^tixi in the area of his f^rujor corji.-itncnt*
This ruse of w.?.r again and again induces
bandits t^ dosort as oxporionco shows,"
(onphasis supplied),
jfc directive of the 9th Corps dated 25 Septonbor 1942
sent to the Jadgkonnando (partisan Inontors) describes
jaow they shall set traps and wait with patience to catch
possible partisans or nine layers. One paragraph in this
- 209 -
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diroctivo is as follows 2
"If tho olenont of siirprisG is no
longer present^ e.g. if "by chance local.,
people turn up, the spot solocted for'
activities is to bo abandoned at once,
unless the inconvenient witnesses can
be done away with quietly,"
This shov/s the utter disregard for the life of the civilian
population by elements subordinate to Reinhardt,
SD detachments were assigned '03- the 9th --vvrj to
Reinhardt^s Panzer Group 3 with directions that the Group
naho further assignments^ ..n order from the Chief of
Staff of Panzer Group 3 to the LVI hrm^- Corps also
discloses such assignment,' It must therefore be said
that Roinhr.rdt know of the 3D being in his area, as oarl^"
as September 1941. That this association with the SD
continued v;hen Panzer Group 3 became the 3rd Panzer .mriiiy
in indicated by the War Diary of the 3rd Panzer :n?my,
v/herein is sot forth, under date of 30 March 1943, an
order by the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Panzer .>ny in
which the f ollow:.ng appears s
"1.) Band supporters n.nd band suspects
arc to bo handed over to the compotont
Senior S3 and Police Loaders for transfer
to a concentration camp, providing thoy
lir.VG not boon shot immodiatoly, rospectiveD
hung, or in special casos assigned to
tho combatting of bands according to
soction 11 of tho ^Circular'.
"2,) Tho pr'pulation is to bo clearly
informed of tho difforonco between ^Forced
Labor* which is carried out under ex-
tror.iely hard conditions, and tno 'Laoor
.aiocation tj tho Reich' on tho basis
of rocruitmont of laoor by tho Ploni-
potontiary General for Labor •
"In this connection it is oraored
"I, Tho band supportors and band suspects
approhondod in tho army area are to bo
handed over to tho Elnsatzkoi.m.ando of
the Security Pollco and tho SD for
transfer to a concentration camxo; Units
of tho SD are located at ViTitobsk, Donldoff,
- 210 -
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VSx3nrnsh, Gorodols:, llowol, Sobosh, Polozk."
ITot only did Rcinh^irdt^s ...my know about tho SD, but
ovor c. long period of tino, it actively cooporc.tod v;ith it
in sending suspects of 0.II kinds, including civilian non,
v7onon, and children for forced labor in tho concentration
canps "under extronely hard conditions". Thoiisands of siich
unfortunates v/ore deported to tho Reich and sent to Lublin
and ..uschwitz through the instruioontality of licinhardt^s
conno-nds •
,"j:iong reports indicating Koinhardt's Imov/lodgo of the
activities of tho SB, wo fihd such notations as tho
followings
"Military hdioinistrative Councillor
llatthcs reports that 700 of the
ovacuoea in PV/*3 transient canp (Bulag)
230 have been scroonod by the SB and
that all of thor.1 are intended for
evacuation to Lublin."
Bulag 230 vjas under Reinhardt *s control,
Undor date of. 2 Soptonbor this notation appears s
"SB Vi'itcbsk reports that the evacuation
of supporters of bands to .'.uschwitz
could not bo offoctod rs yet because the
railroads did not allocato cars,"
Hndor dato of 18 Septoiobor it is noted
"Q,u, 2 arrvOngos with SB that in case the
evacuation to the Reich fails to riatorializo,
tho people will bo deported by the SB to
.i.uschv/itz or Lublin as soon as shipnont Is
possible, SB is directed to s one. tno 700
prisoners frou Granki to PW transient
canp 230,"
On 6 October 1943, tho Gonnandor of rkilag 230 reported
and also
"that a convoy of 3l J.ion, 172 wonon and 240
children had arrived. It consists of tho
bend population rounded up by tho troops.
There are now ab-''Ut 1000 civilians in Dulag
who can bo transported";
"V/lioro old people and sv.iall children are
concernod, SB cannot (as discussed v/ith Obor-
sturnfuehror Ilodor) transport tho people to
Lublin or .^.uschwltz,"
-211 -
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aOn 19 October 19C;3 the f Dllowing wes reported
"Visit of the Sccrot Field Police Group
717 concorninG the question as to v;aich
car.ip civilian prisoners can bo sent to, 'vvho
are old and inPirn -and wlao have snail
children, and v/hoso kin have boon onocutod
as bandits or bandit supporters or have
boon handed over to the SD to bo transportoc:
to Lublin. It soens intoloro.blo to settle
those persons anywhere in the ..crny ^
because they spread an oxtronoly polsonoa
atnosphere against the Gornans."
^ba order of 12 .^ugust 1943 by the 3rd Pa.iizer .erup
contained the following:
";.ooording to Pz. :.0K. 3, la JIo. 6262/43
seorot, it is ordorod to ovacuato the araa
designated in the above roforonco
it was established beyond doubt tnat tno
population helped the bands dancing the
operations of the 2nd ane 7th J-ogor
Battalions. SV V/itobsk has declared itself
ready to o.rrango that tho population v/mcn
is to bo evacuated will bo s ont to on SB
caop (Lublin)«"
Tho distribution list shows that tho arny sent a copy of
tho order to "SD 'Jltobsk" for information.
Seven days later, on 19 ..ugust 1943, another order
Y/as issued relating to tho sane evacuation and by tho
saaao authority, ^uiong other things, the order stated
"... This concerns approxlnatoly 2,500
persons froro tho district ^)f .'/itobsic.
to whom about 500 civilians froia tho
district of Sura.sh v/ill be a5-dod, Tho
letter ere to bo brought to Transit
Grrrp 230 by the Ilnd Luftwaffe Field
Corps. SutTiciont oqulpnont for the
trip, including additional fojd, is to
bo allowed to the persons to bo
cvacuatod, x.,11 cattle, agricultural
equipment and agricultural proc.ucts, _
ronaining v/lll bo taken over Oj economic
Dotachnent, Gr jup -.gricuxturo.^ ..oport
on tho rbx^s tav.on over is ^
to 0. Ln. 2/lVa by 31_-ugu3t 1^45_^
"Tho request to SDiiU i >»/M " _ ^ j_ «
separate vmnistal:r.blo L'hG ro-io uiu-i-i-c --- ,Ca«p 230 and to trdco tho.o ^vor
for the purvJosG of aoc odating
In Lublin, oontinuos to bo up.iolp.
- 232 -
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"Bcsxc'lOs proporly ^oolcing ciftor thon
and f OGding ^hpn Tifhich has ii^oaa-y "boon
ordorocl, 'Transit Gainib 239 v;ill a^s-o soo
i-X wT t^h fhn n(^'COSSarYto indoctrinating thon with the noCQSsc.vj
propaganda' '(osp'ooiairy also inforiaing
thon bi'"t-ho roasoh for pl\o oYacuati-oh -jLargo SQption.s "of th-9 population aiding
thvO^Tboxids i~ tSc innocent onos nust suffer
\7ith tho guilty -.^nos),'^
Eoinhardt hold tho oxocutivo poY/or for his aroa and
it was his duty to oxorciso it for tho protoction of tho
• ti'
population. Ho was obligs-tod not to doport thon, not to
d;.Gspoil then of tholr prox^orty, nor to sond both those
Innocont and those guilty of aiding the so-callod bands
to ooncontratxon camps, as woll as sending the 1925 s.nd
19S6 groups to forcod la.bor in tho Roich. Tho ordiors to
do those things woro criminal ordors s.ndi thoy v/oro fully
ixiplGnontod by him. Ho Is criminally rosponslblo for
issuing tho ordors and for tho acts done in implonontatlon
of thon.
V/hothor or fiot Roinhardt Icnov/ that Lublin and
^.uschv/ltz v/oro nurdor institutions is not natorial, Thoro
is no direct ovldonco that ho did. One of his ordors
shov/s ho Imow that tho forcod labor was hard. Ho know
thoy woro penal cs.nps. Ho sont old non,, wonon, "Jxd
ohildron to thorn. His own tostinony convicts hin of
knowlodgo that tho SD killod cripples-. Ho had Imovm
this for two years. Ho Imow thoy oporatod under tholr
ov/n authority, convoyod by ordors of v/h:^so origin and
nirturo ho xorofossod ignoranco and yet ho turned over to
thorn largo nur.ibors of tho civilian population over whom
ho had powor and v/hon ho was undor a duty to protect.
Ho turned civilians ovor to this organization over
which ho also says ho had no control. Slave hunting
in his aroa was so gonoral and long continuod that
without tho direct evidonco pointed out, knowlodgo would
O T
I Vi'V''iiT ii'--''•t f-; iiii.i iMiliii»ii mW 'in'iii'rii in/' ^ I'l itiI''t'iMHiiii'ii^ii'riinfl<i'''"iriifi ' r irr'n^n'
Too iiMputod to hli!i,
»• t
TliQ Tpibunal, on all the ovidonco^ f^ds Hoinhard't
Guiltj on Sounts Tivonand Throo of the Indictnon-t.
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HANS VQH S^'^Li'-'UTH
Hans von Salniath was born in Metz pn 21 November 1888.
He became an gfficer aspirant in September 1907 and served
in the first World War, first as battalion and executive
officer and then as General Staff Officer, ^fter the end
of the war he remained in the Heichswehr where he held
various assignments. He was promoted to Brigadier General
in 1937 and became Chief of the General Staff of ii.rmy
Group Berlin. In September 1939 he became Chief of General
Staff of iirmy Group North and took part in the Hollsh cam
paign. at about th^s same time he was promoted to Major
General. From October 1939 to May 1941 he was Chief of
General Staff of ^rmy Group B, during which time he was
promoted to Lieutenant General of the Infantry. From May
to December 1941 he was Commanding General of the XXX
Corps and participated in the Russian campaign. From 21
March to 6 June 1942 he was Deputy Commander of the 17th
iirmy and from 6 June to 13 July 1942 he was Deputy Com
mander of the 4th Army, On 13 July 1942 he was appointed
Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd army and promoted to General
in January 1943. In October 1943 he was appointed Deputy
Commander of the 15th itrmy and subsequently became its
Commander-in-Chief, a command which he retained until
/lUgust 1944.
He was not a member of the Nazi Party or any of its
formations.
The defendant is charged under Counts Two and Three
of the Indictment and the charges urged against him in
respect to these counts come under the following headings
which we will consider in serial order: (I) The Commissar
Order; (2) The Commando Order; (3) Prohibited Labor of
Prisoners of V»far; (4) IViurder and Ill-treatment of Prisoners
- 215 -
of Wnr; (5) Deport?tlon and Enslavement of Civilians;
(6) Plunder of Public and Private Property and wanton de
struction; (7) Murder, Ill-treatment, and Persecution of
Civilian Population; (3) Discrimination, Persecution,- and
Execution of Jews, Including cooperation with the Einsatz-
gruppen in this program.
1. The Commissar Order.
The Commissar Order was received by the defendant
while he v^as Commanding General of the XXX Army Corps. The
evidence shows that it wa.s distributed to subordingte units
by him. He states that he rejected the order and acquaint
ed his divisional commanders x<rith his objections. The evi
dence does not establish that the order was ever carried
out within the XXX Army Corps while it was under the com
mand of the defendant. Two instances are cited which, it
is urged, show it w^e carried out; in one instance within
the 17th Army over v/hich he subseauently became the Cora-
mander-in-Chief. This instance occurred approximately
one month before his arrival. The second instance relied
on occurred in the 4th Army approximately one month after
he assumed command. This instance is considered ambiguous
as to whether or not the commissars were in fact executed
after they had been taken prisoner. In neither instance,
however, is it considered that the defendant can be charged
because from the time element, it cannot be said that they
occurred vjith his acquiescence or aporoval or due to any
order which he had distributed.
- 216 -
2. The Commando Order.
The evidence shows that this'or^er and also Hitler's
supplement to it were received by the defendant while
Commander—in—Chief of the 2nd Army. On 25 Octobei? he
transmitted this order for conplianbs with a'cover; letter
to units x-jithin his command and requested that all copies
were to be returned to AOK 2 by 10 November. This cover
letter wns signed by his chief of staff and shov/s the
initials O.B., Commander-in-Chief. The defendant states
that his chief-of staff should not have signed the letter
and was not authorized to do so, but he did nothing to
repudiate this action of his chief of staff, nor is it
shown that he reprimanded him In any way therefore.
It is shown further that an order for the 580th Rear
Array Area, signed by then Quartermaster, was issued, pro
viding:
"Members of terror and sabotage troops,
agents, who fall into the hands of the Wehr»-
macht are to be turned over to the SD with
out delay."
and that
"Any military detention, in prisoner of war
camps, etc. is most strictly forbidden, even
if considered only as a temporary measure."
On 8 October 1942 the AOK 2 requested clarification
froa Array Group B of dubious points arising from ,
applicr.tion of tho Corar.iando Order»
It is obvious that he transmitted this order for ex
ecution Wiierever it was considered applicable, whether to
British, Americans, or Russians.
3, Prohibited Labor of Prisoners of vVar.
Under the conditions confronting the defendant, it is
considered as a matter of fact that the use in the combat
- 2l'5' ~
areas of prisoners of war constituted a use in a dangerous
area. Numerous documents and the testimony of witnesses
including the defendant in this case establish this.
Furthermore, Exhibit 226 and rebuttal exhibits 58, 59 and
60 show the illegal use of captured soldieis of the western
powers. The western powers were signatories to the Geneva
Convention as w=>s G-ermany^ and the uses to which they were
put were illegal under the provisions of that Convention.
This fact is shown by the documents themselves and the
defendant must accept criminal responsibility for his use
of prisoners of war both on the eastern and western fronts.
Exhibits 524 and 526, among others, are cited to show
this illegal use.
4. Murder and Ill-treatment of Prisoners of War and
Red Army Soldiers.
On 25 July 1941, the OKH issued an order which was
transmitted in the chain of command by Salmuth's XXX Corps.
This was obviously an illegal order in that it provided
that Red Army soldiers "are to be considered guerillas
as from a certain date, to be fixed in each area, and are
to be treated as such". This Tribunal finds also that the
defendant was criminally responsible for its transmittal.
On 21 November 1941, von Salrauth transmitted an order
concerning partisans to subordinate units which provided
that "every civilian and also every dispersed soldier who
is found in the possession of arms in the region of the
XXXth AK is to be shot immediately". Von S^lmuth signed
this order and it is found to be an illegal order. This
order was executed within the command of the defendant.
Concerning the treatment of prisoners of war in the
areas under the defendant, numerous reports from these areas
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shoY/ what must be considered as an excessive number of
d0a,th§ by shooting and ofeherv/ise among the prisoners of
war. They imply a degree of negligence on the part of the
defendant but v/e need pp-t discuss this question. These
reports shov/ that prisoners of war wero handed over to the
SD, a police organization, and that thereafter the army
exercised no supervision over them and apparently had no
control or record as to what became of them,
^Ddiother or not they were liquidated, as many of them
undoubtedly were, is not the question. The illegality
consists in handing them over to an organization which
certainly by this time the defendant know Viras criminal
in nature.
The defendant undertakes to state that ho had no
supervision over those prisoner of v/ar camps, i'rom the
evidence v/e are of the opinion that the defendant was
rosponsiblo for prisoners of war within his area and
also had control over thorn and that he must accept
criminal responsibility for the illegal transfer of those
prisoners to the SD,
5* Doporto-tion and Enslavement of Civilians,
Concerning the question of the uso of the civilian
population in the army area of the defendant and the
illegal rocrultmont and transportation of civilin.n slave
laborers to tho Reich, tho ovidonco ostablishos the
defendant's responsibility, Nui-norous docmionts in ovidonco
might bo cited and, furthormoro, documents introduced in '
rebuttal show that tho extonsion of this program, both
in tho wost and tho oast, was ono v/hich the dofondant
strongly TATgod,
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A defense witness, Karteneck, who acted as the chief
of staff of the defendp>nt, shows that this labor was compul
sory, Th§ documents speak for themselves. But if further
evidence is needed, the defendant's own testimony on the
stand shows that this labor was compulsory. The record
shovjs the defendant vras guilty, both of using prohibited labor
of civilians in operations directly concerned with the con
duct of the war and of transporting.-..-^ slave laborers
to the Reich.
6. Plunder of Public and Private Property.
The evidence in this case is not considered sufficient
to establish criminal connection for plunder of public and
private property.
7, Murder, Ill-treatment, and Persecution of
Civilian Population's.
The evidence does not establish beyond a reasonable
doubt the transmitt'^1 of the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order
by the defendant. The evidence does, however, establish
many instances of the illegal executions of civilians by
units subordinate to the defendant. From this evidence
the folloxving exhibits are cited:
From 15 to 30 April 1942 a report of the Feldkom-
mandantur to the 44th Army Corps of the 17th Army under
von Sal.'iutli shows the shooting of persons as partisan sus
pects, Communists, for stealing army property, as Jews,
and the turning over of Jewish women to the SD.
A report dated 2 September 1942 from the Korueck 580
to AOK 2 under von Salmuth shows the hanging of persons
"strongly suspected" of sabotage.
*
Reports from the same Korueck addressed to AOK 2,
covering a period from 7 October to 12 November 1942, show
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on IS October "a large number of ...... , „
that in the localities near-Were-teni.io ^
00.. . p..„l ^ «"« 0„„,,
shot. looking men" were
Areport of 2 September 1942 states:
longer e.xiltor"n!t surprise no •
habitants apoear by because In-Site must be^ immpflfQ? f ^ chosen
^he troublesome abandoned if
eliminated sll-ently?"°-ennot be
A report shows 6 onn
«<. ...Of. 0, ^
Ke D, • lofoloUog the SW,t/ar iary of the 17i-h' a
' 24 July 1942 Salmuth,
hlsaolved on'22 ITy
olvni.r . or six hundred and fifty-fivel iliexis wno passed through one ^ .
- m, one hundred and fiftv .i-ut-
were liquidated and twenty thre • ""y-elght
Wi.pt' sanded over to the SD.®tr-er or not these and otj.ier executi
the evidence, by his eubordlnate..s were u
Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order 1^ to the
ifiimaterisl. These mon i
executions were carried out o Uleeal
, -ft.~
Oh „h„. "7
... T . -lesuit in such orimirifliacts by his subordinates Am .
these Is cited an OlfW
order of 16 December 1942 whl.h ,-u1942 Which the defendant distributed
for information and further Action ' t
» wblch provided thnt
P....h .Uh Ph. vph B„„.h»..h Bh..hpu.„, Ohh.P ..
a.s partisan warfare was x,
, , , . ®°"herned by providing that nopunishment snould be imposed upon troops because of their
conduct and that no sentence should be confirmed which 0
tradloted this order. It also provided:
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"If this war agalpst the bands in the East
and the Balkans is not waged with the most
brutal methods,"the available forces will
in the near future no longer be sufficient
to overcome this plague.
"For this reason the troops are justified
and obliged to resort in this combat to
all measures - even against women and
children - without leniency, as long as
they are successful."
AOK 2,under the defendant, even recommended a sup
plement to this order, submitted on 12 April 1943 to the
Army G-roup Center which provided:
"During interrogation of bandits, also that
of women, all means have to be employed in
order to get the necessary statements. In
terpreters are to be specially trained for
the interrogation of bandits. It is fre
quently necessary to interrogate an indi
vidual bandit several times in order to
get a result."
On 7 August 1941,Salmuth's XXX Corps received from the
AOK 11 an OKH order of 25 July 1941 concerning the treatment
of enen:y civilians and prisoners of war. This order he dis
tributed down to l;he battalions of his Corps. It provided
in pertinent part as follows:
"Attacks and all kinds of acts of violence
against persons and objects, as well as all at
tempts, are to be beaten down ruthlessly by use
of arras until the enemy is destroyed.
"in cases of passive resistance or road
obstructions, shootings, raids, or other acts
of sabotage where the culprits cannot be
determined at once a.nd taken care of in the
already ordered manner, collective forcible
measures are to be carried out without delay
by order of an officer not below the rank of a
battalion commander etc. It is specifically
pointed out that it is not necessary previously
to take hostages to hold liable for future of
fenses. The population is held responsible for
order in their areas even without special pre
vious announcement and arrest.
"Attacks and assaults on natives assigned
by us to work (for instance, road construction,
agriculture, trades, factories) and on super
vising personnel, constitute attacks on the
occupation forces and are to be punished as such."
This and other evidence in this case prescribed the
employment of ruthless collective measures and terror
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activities against the civilian population. On 26 November
1941 the XXX Corps distributed to subordinate units an
order, in pertinent part as follows:
"The incidents which happened during the
last days, during which several G-erman and
Roumanian soldiers lost their lives during at
tacks of partisans, require severest counter-
measures.
"2.) Therefore immediately the following persons
are to be taken hostages in all places vdiere troops
aTe stationed:
a.) persons whose reletives are partisans.
b.) persons who are under suspicion to be
in contact with partisans.
c.) party members, Korasoraolzen, party
applicants.
d.) persons v:ho formerly were members of the
party.
e.) persons, who, prior to the moving in of
the G-err.ifln and Roumanian troops had any
official functions, i.e., village magis
trates and deputies, members of the local
Soviet, party officials of any kind,
directors of stgte institutions of any
kind, sanptoriums, etc.
f.) persons who are found outside tne closed
villages without a special permit.
"3,) These hostages are to be accommodp.ted in con
centration camps. Their food must be supplied by
the inhabitants of the village.
"4.) From these hostages 10 are to be shot for
each G-erman and Roumanian soldier who is killed by
partisans, and 1 of the hostages is to be shot for
every G-ermgn or Roumanian soldier wounded by parti
sans; if possible they are to be shot near the
place where the German or Roumanian soldier was
killed and then they are to be left hanging at that
place for 3 days,"
The record shows such collective actions to have been
carried out by subordinate units under the defendant's
various commands.
The Tribunal finds from the evidence above cited and
other evidence in this c^se th.^t the defendant sponsored,
gicauiesced in, and approved such illegal executions within
the areas of his command.
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8. Discrimination, Persecution, and Execution of Jews, in
cluding cooperation with the i^insatzgruppen in this
Program.
On 1 August 1941 a Ukrainian woman reported a secret
meeting of some fifty local Jews and Bolshevists who she said
planned to collect and destroy leaflets dropped by German
planes requesting the Ukrainian popula.tion to resume work in
the fields, and to attack the German military officers after
the Jews had become strong enough by calling in other per
sons.
On 2 August the XXX Corps reported to the 11th Army,
a pertinent part of which is as follows:
"On the basis of this report the SS Einsatzkom-
mando X a, stationed in Olschanka was informed
immediately. The Einsatzkommando was requested
to disoatch a detachment to Kodyma immediately
in order to prevent the execution of the inten
tions of the'Jews and Bolsheviks on the same_
afternoon by an extensive action in the Jewish
quarters. The actionwas executed under tne
command of SS-Hauptsturrafuehrers Prast and
300 members of various troop units were also
emoloyed to block off the city quarter involved
The action started on 1515 hours and was
finished at 1900 hours.
"III. Results
"A total of 400 male persons were arrested,
mostly Jews. These were subjected to an in-
terrogOvtion- in the market place of Kodyma. It
was remarkable that many of these Jews were
from Haiti, Soroki, Jampol and other localities
formerly occupied by German troops, in particu
lar former leading communists. 98 of these
400 persons were proven active members of the
Communist Party (functionaries and the like;
and/or urgently suspect of participation in
the intended plots.
"The rest of the persons consisted to a great
part of asocial elements of the Jewish race.
The first mentioned 98 persons were shot to
death outside of the village pursuant to the
directive of SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Prast, after
they were briefly screened and interrogated
II
once more.
On 2 August 1941 the 11th Army made the following
entry in its Diary:
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"Preparation of a plot by Jev/e ^^ncL Komsomols
in Kodym?. G-ring le.^^ders .-^nd suspects were
shot. In addition 170 hostages .-rrested."
On 3 August 1941 Sonderkommando 10a reported to Einsats-
gruooen D as follows:
^ Xn agreement with the commanding general,
99 of the persons arrested were shot, .among
them 97 Jews, approximately 175 were taken as
hostages, the rest released. Executions were
carried out by 24 men of the V^ehrmrciit anci 12
of the Security Police * * .
On 2 August 1941 Sonderkommando 10a filec. s report
concerning this instance, pertinent parts of which read, a.s,
follows:
"3y interrogation of anc. confront'^tion
wTith Ukrainian inhabitants of tne town, tyS
persons were identified who naci taken part
in the meetings or v^ho had ben-'ved in an in
subordinate manner to the German military,
or who had belonged to the Jewish intel
ligentsia."
The hepdoua.rters of the XXX Corps on 1 August w^s lo-
c^ited in Kowno ^^nd the defend'-Tnt w^s in command of the area,
includin.g that city which consisted of about 10,000 people.
The o-efendant on the stand denies his particlp-tlon in or
knowledge of this incident until after it had t-ken place
and he is supported in his position by tne testimony of nis
then chief of staff, Harteneck, and nis Ic, Eism--nn. I—e
stories of these three witnesses, however, are not consis
tent. kor is the def cnd'-^nt *s own testimony consistent wioj.^
itself.
The record further shows that subsequent to the exe
cution herein described, th^t on the evening of 1 August
.-nd prior to 8:30, the defendant issued a proclam-^tion to
the copulation of Kodyma -as follows:
"l.) A number of persons were shot tod--y, bo-
cause it had become known to the German Coniu^^nd that
'Cf^epar'^tions were beine: made for secret ^tt-^cks
a^hahnst the troops of the German wehrrri'-^cht in ti
- 2fi5 -
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town.
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"2.) Besides, a further number of persons were
taken liostpges and brought to the prison cpmp. they
will not be harmed if the population of the tovm'
shows a quiet and loysl'attitude tov/ards the troop
detachments in the torn and towards G-ermaii soldiers.
"5.) However, should any troop detachments or
individual G-erman members of the '.^ehrmpcht or any
installations of the German vvehrmacht in the to^-v. or
in the vicinity of Kodyna be attacked, the German
Command shall be obliged to have more executions
ordered. Only a quiet and loyal attitude of the
entire population secures the lives of tnose
hostayes.
"4.) It is herewith being ordered that until
further notice the population of Kodyna. has to pro
vide for the provisioning of these hostages. The
Town Kajor is arr.^nging for details with the local
commander and the commander of the prison camp.
"5.) Starting immediately the civilian popu-
la.tion is forbidden to leave their homes between
20:30 and 4:00 o'clock in the morning. Anyone
being in the streets during this time will be shot
Kodyna, 1 August 1941.
The German Gommand."
On 2 August he signed an order to his troops which
reads a.s follows:
"2,) Participation of soldiers in actions amainst
Jev7s and Communists:
"The fanatical Intent of tne members of the Communist
Party 2nd of the Jews to stop tne German vvehrmacht
at all cost must be broken under all circumst ••nces.
In the interest of the security of the Army rear
area it is therefore necessary to proceed with all
vigor, Sonderkommandos have been charged with this
mission. At one place, however, members of the
Araied Forces participated in such an action in m
unpleasant manner.
"For the future I order
" Only these soldiers may particlp-^te in
such a.ctions who are expressly ordered to
do so. I also forbid all members of the
troops subordinate to rae any p-^rticipation
as Bpect'^tors.
"In-srauch =^s members of the Armed Forces are
ordered to participate in such actions, tney
must be under the command of officers. Tnese
officers ^^re responsible tnat every unple'^—
sant excess on the part of the troops be
avoided."
It also appears in none of the documents or the testl-
money herein that the defendant in any wy protested against
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or criticized the action of the SD or requested their re
moval or punishment. The only punishment inflicted, accord
ing to the testimony, upon BXiy one lyas apparently a twenty
day confinement sentence against a member of his 0^^1:1 staff
for unathorized participation in this action.
If ve are to accept the rather flimsy pretext that
some Jev's in Kodyraa were planning action against the jehr-
macht, the evidence established that the executions recoro.ed
were far beyond, the punishment of those involved in any sucn
conspiracy and constituted a murder action, and the Tribuns.1
finds from these documents and other evidence tnat tne defen-
di^nt acquiesced in and approved this crimina.l action.
Csrta.inly from then on the defendant hnew of tne murder
activities of the SIPO .and SD. vJhen he turned over prisoners
of war and clvili.anB to them, he knew what could be expected
as to their fate. V^hen these unite operated in his area ne
knew the murderous functions they performed. Notwithstand
ing, on 7 August he transraltted the OKH order of 25 July
1941 which provided:
"Suspected elements who, although they
cannot be proved guilty of a serious crime,
seem dangerous because of their attitude
and behavior are to be handed over to the
Einsatzgruppen or tne Kommandos of the SP
(SD). The moving about of civilla,ns t-dth-
out travel authorization must be stopped."
On 24 July 1942 Korueck 530, which was the re^r are^'.
of the AOK 2 under von Snimuth, directed:
"A Sonderkomma.ndo of the Security Police and
of SD i'o. 4ca has been attached to AOK 2 for
the carrying out of special security police
taeks; outside of the jurisdiction of the
troops. The Sonderkoramando c-rries out its
mission on its own responsibility. The AQli
will coordinate the tasks of this Sender-
kommando with tnose of the military counter
intelligence, the •••ctivlty of the secret
field police and with oper'-tlonal require
ments. "
And on 4 July 1943, while Comraander-in-Chief of the 4th
- 227 -
Army, the defend-snt signed a report as follows:
"ill. _Collab^ra.tion wljtii_the_G-FP_(^e^r^t_F^eld
Po].i£ejL,_S_ena.or ^S_ard__Poli.c^ If®^der_s,
Plenipo^ent_iari^s_of
Policej_ VrsB S_D_and_the__Ji'in^3.A2^tab_R£S£ri-
berg.
"Collaborption v.ritli all G-erman offices
was very good. Fspecialiy in the Corps
areas, the cooperation of the GFP
(Secret Field Police) with the Commands
proved very advantageous."
On 86 December 1944, he issued a directive signed b;
his chief of staff, as follows:
"7,) The Sonderkoffimando 4a of the Security
Police and the SD
"is subordinate to the Army with regard to
routing, supplies and s.ccomnodstions.
"The Kommando receives its oper:tional orders
from the Chief of the Security Police and the
SD.
"The Army has the right to issue orders vhen
they are required in order to avoid interference
with operations. Besides, it is the respon
sibility of the Ic/AO to coordinate the tasks
of the Kommando vjith the interests of the
military Counter Intelligence, the activities
of the GFP and the requirements of the
Operations.
"The head of the Kommando must effect a close .
collaboration with the Ic/AO of the Army.
Since the oper'^tional area of the Kommando is
PS a matter of principle restricted to the
Army Rear Area(with the exception of.indivi
dual c?^ses) a close colir.bor-tion with the
O.GiU./Qu. S and the Commander of the Army
Rear Area is also indicated.
"Counter intelligence t.^sks within the^ troops
and their counter intelligence protection
pre the sole tasks of the GFP. (initial)
ki."
The record does not establish tne extenb or loca.tion
of the liquidations pursuant to this program carried out
within those areas, but it does establish his cooperation
with the Finsatzgruppen, knowing their murderous functions.
On 24 hay, while in command of the 17th Army, the
defendant distributed an order to subordinate units, re-
auirins the registration of all citizens except Jews,
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foreigners, Red Army soldiers, and certain other categories,
and orovlded that:
"Persons supplying shelter to new arrivals
(also to members of the family) without
the certificate or with a forged certifi
cate aJ?e shot to death Just as those per
sons who take quarters In a place (hide
overnight) , without having obtained the
i-frltten permission of the mayor."
In other words the order provided for the registration
of certain civilians and excluded others, Including Jews,
who apparently v/cro to bo shot for n®t having
the certificate with which they were not provided.
For the reasons above stated concerning this defendant,
we find him guilty under Counts Two and Three of the
Indictment.
' '"•'i f'
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KARL HOLLIDT
Karl Hollidt vms born in Spe^er on the Rhine on 28
April 1891. After a normal education, he became an of
ficer aspirant in July 1909, and in Hovember 1910 became
a Second Lieutenant of Infantry. In the first World War
he was a combat soldier and was wounded. Subsequent to the
first Ivorld Vtfar he served with the Free Corps and later was
Himdred
accepted into the Reichswehr or One/Thousand Man Army as
a Captain. He stated in his affidavit that he was promoted
to Brigadier General in the summer of 1953.
He did not participate in the Polish campaign but, at
the onset of the war, took over command of the 52nd Infantry
Division and was committed for the defense of Saarbrucken in
the West Wall. In April 1940 he v/as promoted to Major Gen
eral. In Hovember 1940 he was given command of the 50th
Infantry Division. He participated in the invasion of ^
areece and later, from Rumania, participated in the invasion
of Russia. In P'ebruary 1942 he was made General of the In
fantry (Lt. General) and given command of the 17th Corps
of the 6th Army. In January 1943 he was appointed commander
of Army (Armeeabteilung) Hollidt, which was later reorganised
as the 6th Array under his command.
In February 1943 he was promoted to General Oborst
(General). In April 1944 he was relieved of his coimnand
and retired to inactive duty. In March 1945 he became
liaison officer of the Chief of Civilian Administration In
Ruhr District whoro ho ronalnod . until April 1945.
Aside from the charge of Crimes against Peace, hereto
fore disposed of in this opinion, we think that chargoa
under Counts Two and Three of the Indictment will bo dealt
with' under the following headings: (1) The Commissar
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Order; (2) The Conmiando Order; (3) Prohibited Labor of
prisoners of War; (4) iviurder and Ill-treatmont of Prisoners
of War; ('5) J-^eportation and Enslavewent of Civilians; (o)
Plunder of Public and Private Property and Wanton destruc
tion; (7) Murder, Ill-treatment and Persecution of CiAolian
Population,
1, The Commissar Order
The evidence shows that the defendant Hollidt received
in writing this order or a similar order providing for the
shooting of political comralsaars. The defendant testified
that he instructed his regimental commanders not to comply
with this order. The only report in evidence as to such oxo-
cutlohs is from the 50th Division is the ambiguous statement
found in Exhibit 1255. A later report submitted by the
17th -^riny Corps of the 6th Array on 15 P'ebruary 1942 dis- ,
closes the execution of two corrmiissars. From thia report it is
not clear that the commissars v/ere executed after capture.
We can only construe such documents favorably to the
defendant.
Furthermore, the defendant denids that he on this
date had assumed command of the 17th Army Corps and alleges
that he did not see this document. It is true that his
service record discloses that he was assigned to this
Corps in January 1948. Hov/ever, an assignment and the
assumption of conmiand are different; and assuming that he
had taken command in January, it can hardly be said that
the execution, if such Is assumed, grew out of any action
or neglect on his part in view of the length of time he
had been v/ith the command.
i/v'e therefore find from the evidence that the defendant
was not crimj.nally connected with this order.
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2. The Commando Order
The 17th •"•rmy Corps received this order and, on his
return from leave in early November 1942, the defendant
Hollidt read it» Ho stated that he saw no reason to pass
on the order and the evidence does not establish that he
did so, and there is no evidence, to show that it was ever
carried out by units under the defendant.
We are therefore unable to find the defendant criminal
ly connected with this order.
3. Prohibited -oabor of Prisoners of War
Documents pertaining to this matter upon which the
prosecution relies pertain to the time "when the defend
ant was in conmiand of the Armeeabteilung Hollidt in the
6th Army. At that time he was in the course of retreat
which covered some 1500 kilometers, and his army was in a
difficult and deplorable condition at various periods
during this retreat, and he dofendod His use of
prisoners of war to some extent upon the exigencies of
the situation which confronted him. This constitutes
no legal defense but Is only in mitigation. Prom the
factual point of view that the defendant was in retreat
and subject to heavy, unexpected attacks it is
evident that the ompioyment of prisoners of war in con
structing field fortifications and for labor with combat
units necessarily put thorn in a position of greater danger
than the same use would have subjected them to on a more
stable front.
The evidence in this case shows that over a wide
period of time prisoners of war v/ere used In the ceir;bat
zone for the construction of field fortifications by units
- 232 -
vv,
• w' fi
' '
'V'-iS
!'<: (3
.'I',
tU'-
tC'.'
subordinate to him which could only have been done with
his knowledge and approv.;!, -ftoports show that prisoners
of v/ar v/cre in fact killed and injured by an attack from
enemy mortars.
We can only find from the evidence that prisoners of
war were usod under the defendant in hazardous v;ork with
the knowledge and approval of the defendant and that ho
is criminally responsible therefor.
4. Murder and Ill-treatment of Prisoners of War
This charge is based in part upon certain documents
which show that prisoners of war were shot by units sub-
ordina.te to the defendant. Ihcse documents a,ro by ho medns
clear as to the clrcumstancos or to the effect that the
shooting \70TG unjiistiflodlbut on the assumption that they
were, it is considered that such instances would have to
be classified as excesses committed by troops with which
no criminal connection of the defendant is established.
The other exhibit oh which the pr'osocution relies under
this heading is hxhlbit 1528, an order p'^rtainlng to the
shooting of parachutists. Tho Tribunal is not of the opinion
that this order constituted an illegal order and we there
fore find no criminal act established against tho defend
ant under this heading.
5. Deportation and hnslavemont of Civilians
The evidence in this case cstsblish-cs v/lthout question
the Illegal use of civilian labor by units under the de
fendant's command v/lth his knowledge and oonsopit. '^hls
laboh was not voluntary and involved.the use of civilians
in the construction of field fortifications contrary to
international law..
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IThe evidence also establishes that the defendant
participated in the rccx'ultrdent of slave labor for the
Belch under the compulsion of orders to do so. He alleges
that he was opposed to this program of recruitment of
labor to be sent to Germany. Hollidt Exhibit 146 bhov/s that
any disapproval was based upon the fact that he needed
such labor for his own purposes,. •
6. Plunder of hublxc and Private Property
In connection with this charge we consider it established
by the evidence and particularly by iicfhibit 575"that the
defendant considered civilian authorities subordinated to
the army in matters concerning evacuation, and he directed
that "everything which could pc usable to the enemy In the
area must be destroyed if no evacuation is possible."
The Tribunal does not feel that the proof establishes that
the measures applied wore not warranted by military neces
sity under the conditions of war in the areas under the
command of the defendant. Nor does uhe proof establish what
property was removed to the rear v/ith his l-mowlodgG and
consent.
Viio are therefore unable to find the defendant criminally
responsible under this heading.
7, Murder, Ill-treatment and Persecution of Civilian
Population
The proof in this case does not establish that the
Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order was ever transmitted by the
defendant. Tho order upon which the prosecution relies is
a drastic military order for the suppression of p.artisans
and to secure the area of tho 5th Infantry Division against
- 234 -
|a.-
" j"-' ''
.e-.-'J
w
.r--
4
it
guerrilla activities by the population. The Tribunal
does not believe that the issuance of this order in itself
constituted an Illegal act for v;hioh the defendant should
be held criminally responsible. It is true that this
order provides for the shooting of persons whose "parti
san activities are proven by their confessions or by
credible testimony of witnesses without court-martial
proceedings" and it can be inferred that it was derived
frora the Barbarossa Jurisdiction 0rder.
If in fact the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order was re
ceived and transmitted in the 50th Division, the order of
the defendant places a limitation upon its enforcement to
the effect that only those persons who were proved by
their own confession or by credible witnesses to have
been guerrillas were to be shot. The above limitation
upon the provisions of the' Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order
is to his credit rather than detriment.
The Tribunal is unable to find beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant is criminally responsible in
those particulars.
Concerning the responsibility of the defendant for
actions of the GPP or Secret i^'ield Police, the documents
cited do not establish criminal responsibility upon his
part under international lav;.
witn regard to the SD operations within the 6th Arn^,
it is considered that there is no evidence to establish
that those activities were confined to more than their
legal functions as a polico organization in connection
with guerrilla warfare within the area of the defendant,
Por the reasons set forth, in connection with the de
fendant's criminal responsibility for the Illegal use of
prisoners of war and for the illegal use of civilians and
their Illegal deportation to the Reloh, we find the defend
ant guilty under Counts Two and Three of the Indictment,
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OTTO SCHNIEWIND
He was born on 14 -OecemboP 1887, and entered the
Nav^r in 1907 as a Midshipman and received various pro
motions up to his appointment as Admiral at the end of
1940. He became Commander of the Fleet in 1941 and re
mained in this position until his retirement at the end
of 1944.
The principal charge against him was that of Criraes
against Peace, which has been heretofore disposed of in
this opinion.
The remaining charges o.re under Counts Two and Tiiree
and are based upon (1) The 3arbarossa Jurisdiction Order;
and (2) The Commfindo Opder.
The Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order was sent by OlitV to
OKIv; on 14 Ivlay 1941 and received the following day. The
defendant did not se^ it until 20 May 1941. At that time
he was Chief of the waval Command Office and Chief of Staff,
of the Havy War Staff, a department in tiio Naval Command
office-. He relinquished this command on 12 June 1941 to
become Commander of the Fleet. The harbarossa Jurisdic
tion Order was not passed on to subordinate units until 17
June, nearly a week after he had left his command. It-
seems the delay was due to some question as to the legality
of this order. It was first s^nt to the legal department
of the Navy Defense Office before it was passed do'wn t o
subordinate units, which, as pointed out,, was after Ad
miral Sohniewind's departure. The prosecution's brief
has this rather naive statement, "For the period after
the receipt of this order, during which time he was still
Chief of Staff of SKL, Schniewind has offered no proof
that he had done anything to discourage or stop the further
distribution of this criminal order." We decline to adopt
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this line of reasoning.
The Commando Order was distributed by SiiL to subordi
nate units on 27 October 1942, after the defendant became
Commander of the Fleet. It was sent to his headquarters
and his subordinate units.
There is no evidence it was implemented by him or en
forced by any units subordinate to him. From the very
nature of the order it is apparent it could have little,
if any, relation to his command of the surface vessels en
gaged in fighting and subordinate to him, viz., the bat
tleships, cruisers, destroyers, torpedo boats, speed boats,
and mine laying ships.
We find the defendant not guilty under Counts Two and
Three of the Indictment and he will bo discharged by the
Marshal whon the Tribunal presently adjourns.
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IKARL VON ROQ.USS
The defendant Karl von Roques was born 7 May 18E30.
During the first World War he.was General Staff Officer,
and after the war remained with.the Relchswehr. On 31
January 1S31, he was released from active duty until 23
.May 19w9, during which time he v/as active in the Civil
Air Raid Protection Service at B'erlin. On 1 December 1939
he became a divisional commander. From the middle"of
March 1941 until 15 June 1942 he was Gomms.naer of the
Rear"Area Army Group South. From about 10 September 1941
until 5 October 1941 he held a coirimand at the front, also
remaining during this time in coramf.nd of the Hear j-irea
Army Group South. From 27 October 1341 until 10 January
1942 he was absent from his coirimanci on account of illness,
during which time Lt. General Frledaflci deputized for him
as commander of the Rear *-iroa Army Group South. During
April 1942 he was absent two weeks on furlough. On 15
June 1942 he was transferred to the Fu.ehX'er Reserve. at
the end of July 1942 he was appointed Conimander of the
Rear Area Army Group A (Caucasus). This appointment be
came effective for the southern part of the former Rear
^ iirea Ji.rmy Group South at the beginning of ^iUgust and for
the Caucasus at the beginning of September 1942. In the
middle of Decembor 1942 the defendant was retired because
of old age and did not participate further in the war.
His last rank was Lt. General to which he was promoted
in 1941.
The defendant von Roques is charged with War Crimes
and Crimes against Humanity, which is s.11 that v/e hex'e
consider inasmuch" as we have elsewhere disposed of the
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charges of 'Crimes against Peace' and the Cons'piracy to
commit Grimes against teace. These crimes under the evi
dence are only such as were committed while the defendant
v;as Commander of the Rear Area of Army Group South and of
the Rear Area of Army Group A. We shall consider these
under the heading of5 (1) The Commissar Order, (2) Pro
hibited Labor of Prisoners of War, (3) Murder and Ill-
treatment of Prisoners of VVar, (4) The Barbarossa Juris
diction Order, (5) Hostages and Reprisals, (6) Ill-treat
ment -and Persecution of the Civilian Population, (7)
Partisan Warfare•
Von Roques* testimony discloses that he had in the
area of his command executive power as the representative
of the occupying power in his area. He stated that he' owed
a duty to the civilian population because he needed its co
operation. Neither his testimony nor his actions show that
he appreciated the fact that he owed a' duty as an occupying
commander to protect the population and maintain order«
•V
• •»
i ..
General Haider in his testimony succinctly defined
executive power 5
"The bearer of executive power in a
certain area unites all the legal authorities
of a territorial nature and legislative
nature in his own person."
The responsibility incident to the possession of oxe^
cutlv© power is well stated in the Judgment of Tribunal V
Case No. 7, U.S. vs. K/ilhelm nlst, et al, as follows;
"•JHHH;-This duty extends not only to the
inhabitants of the occupied territory but
to his own troops and auxiliaries as v;ell.
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>The conunanding general of occupied terri
tory having executive authority as well as
military cormumd, v/ill not be heard to say
that a unit taking unlawful orders from
someone other than hiinself, was responsible
for the crime and that he is thereby cab-
sotved from responsibility. It is here
claimed, for example, that certain SS units
under the direct command of Heinrich Hirrmiler
committed certain of the atrocities herein
charged without the knowledge, consent or
approval of these defendants, -t^t this
cannot be a defense for the comiTianding general
of occupied territory. The duty and respon
sibility for malnbaining peace and order, and
the prevention of crime rests upon the com
manding general. Ho cannot ignore obvious
facts and plead ignorance as a defense."
' In the Yamo-shita Case decided by the Supreme Court of
the United States, on which case we have elsewhere comraented
in the Judgment, it is stated:
"These provisions plainly imposed on
petitioner, who at the time specified was
military governor of- the Philippines, as
well as commander of the Japanese forces,
an affirmative duty to take such measures
as were within his power and appropriate
in the circumstances to protect prisoners
of war and the civilian populaticTn." ~
(Emphasis supplied}
We arc of the opinion that command authority and
executive power obligate the one v;ho wields t"hem to
exercise them for the protection of prisoners of war and
the'civilians in hie area; end that orders issued v/hich
indicate a repudiation of such duty and Inaction with
knowledge that others within his area are violating this
duty which he owes, constitute criminality. The record
shows orders by the defendant, knowledge, approval and
acquiescence in acts by troops under his authority, and
by agencies within his area which violated the most elo-
mentary duty and obligations owed to prisoners of war
and the civilian population by the coimnander of an oc-
o-upylng army, having command authority and executive power.
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"vVe have heretofore held this order criminal and need
not further comrtient ttereon. Von Hoques admitted that he
learned of this order In June or July of 1941, Ke denies
having passed it on but from a consideration of the docu
ments and the extensive implementation of the orders by
units under his coimuand, serious doubt is cast on the
truth of his tostlmony and that of soinG' of his defense
witnesses; but whether the order was or was no,t passed on
by him, its implementation was so extensive in his terri
tory as to require action on his part to prevent the
criminal action that was carried on by the units under him
and agencies in his area. Commissars were regularly shot
with his knowledge, and he did nothing aoout it.
One paragraph of tho Commissar Order in the light
of the documeatary evidence is important. It is as follows.
"II. In the Rear Areas.
Coniraissars arrosted in the rear area
on account of doubtful behavior are to bo
handed over to the 'hinsatzgruppe' or the
•aiinaatzkommandos' of the SS Security Ser
vice (SD) respectively." *
The documents disclose that the Security I^lvisions Nos..
444, 215 and 454 for much of the time were subordinate to
von Hcquos. He contends that in tho early part of the war
against Ri.issia, these Socurit;/ Divisions were subordinate to
Army Croup South, but while thoy were subordinate to the
Army Group In the early days of the war merely for simulating
an attack they were "to remain fully subordinate to the
Commanders of the Rear Areas of the ^i-rmy Groups."
On 20 June 1941 the 4&4ti:i Division had the Commissar
Order. An order of this division, 2 August 1941, provided
for segregation in the camp of "politically intolerables "
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to b, a.alt wltlt PJ the C.mp Co„paont=, In eooonaanoe .ith
special orders Issued.
An order of the 444th Security Division, bearing date
of 14 June 194S requires the groups of the Secret Pxeld
Police to submit reports to Section 1 o of the divxsion
by the 10th and 25th of each mnnth, ^giving tne number
commissars identified and listing them as commissars with
the troops, civilian coimlssars, and commissars turned
over to the SD; and if no commissars had been identxfied,
report to that effect is required. This order,'us noted before,
is datc3ai4 Jxine 1942 and von Hoques says he left for the
Fuehrer deserve on 13 June. There is a reference in the
order to two previous orders that were dated respectively
29 August 1941 and 30 January 1942. It is apparent that
ibc mitter covered was not new to the divisions, and that
3, year after the war began Hoques r troop.s were carrying
out the Ooirjiaiasar Order.
Ateletype dated 25 July 1941 fron Roques ' Hear Area
Army Group to the Sec^ity Division 213 announces the
...rival of an SS Brigad. on 24 July and says it is to be
25 July 1941, jackeln, the Uommander of the SS Brigade,
issued an order for amopping up operation describing^
towns and locations shown by the operational maps of 20
J.ay and 5August 1941 to have been throughout that time
in von Hoques' Army Group Rofir Area. In his order of com
^,t,ent Jackein states that contact is to be established
the Ukrdnian militia if present in the various towns.
. p-s "that Ukrainians who are still wearing the Soviet
He states
to f tt."." " o' <•» "»
Ming"; that »~.tf "• " '• "
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him, Jackeln, for thorough interrogation by the SS
leader of his staff, and that similar agents or Jews
who offered their services to the Soviets are to be
treated accordingly. Six days later, this same gS and
Police leader, Jackeln, reports as follows;
"To: AOK 6
One copy each to
Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German
. Police
Korueck
General von Roquos
Korueck
Major General von Puttkammer
Chief of the Ordnungs Polizei
General of the Police Daluege
"II
jt ' 1.) By request of General Peld Marshall
von Reichenau, the Reichfuehrer SS made
available the 1st SS Brigade for a mopping-
up operation in the army rear area and/or
^ Rear Area Army Group.
The carrying out of this operation in
the area of Zwiahel, Slucz Valley, Northwest
of Miropol, Szepetcwka, Zaslaw, Ostrog, Horyn
Valley, Hoszcza, took place according to the
directives of the Chief of Staff of AOK 6 in
accordance with the commander of the army
rear area, Major-General von Puttkammer, and
the commander of the rear area army group,
Genero.l von Roques.
2») The units subordinated to me had the
^ order, as far as they were available for this
operation:
Arrest and/or execution of
a) ^eii'^ining parts of the 124th
i Soviet ^ifle Division,
b) -rt-rraed bands
c) Guerrillas
d) Persons who have assisted the
Bolshevist System. .....
4'c <-
9.) Total number of persons captured:
135 soldiers of Ukrainian
nationality transferred to
transient prisoner camp (Dulag)
Shot;
73 Russian soldiers (Guerillas)
165 Functionaries and other persons
who have rendered considerable
service to the Bolshevist system,
among them 4 women.
1658 Jews who have rendered considerable
services to the Bolshevist system
and who repo^^ted Ukrainians to
Bolshevist rulers."
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It is clear from this that von Roques^ -array Group South
knew of this coraraitment, permitted it in its area, and re
ceived a report after it was completed. It is clear that
73 Russian soldiers v/ere shot as guerillas, that 165
functionaries were shot, and that 1658 Jews were shot.
From the face of the report, it is apparent that these
1896 executions were all in violation of International
Lav/. Von Roques says that this was done on Reichenau*s
responsibility and not his, but a large part of the
operations were in the area of his command. He admits
that he quartered the SS Brigade, and that his Chief of
Staff reported the accomplished fact to him. Certainly
after 1 ^vugust 1941 von Roques could never contend' that he
did not know that it was the function of the S.S and SD to
exterminate commissars and Jews.
A report of the Chief of the Security Police and the
SD, dated 17 July 1942, shows that the SD at Wladimir-Wolnysk
gave special treatment to 36 commissar functionaries from
a Russian Officer's Camp and to 76 Jewish Bolshevist of
ficers v/ho were planning to escape. This place was in
von Roques' area according to the operational map of 20
July 1941, and von Roques in his testimony said the bound
aries of his area were fixed by 10 July 1941.
An activity report of the 454th Security Division for
the month of November 1941 stated that 24 Politruks and
officials of the NICVD were shot for illegal activities.
On 24 August 1941, only 24 days after the mass killing
of Jev/s and functionaries which we have referred to, von
Roques signed an order in v/hich he stated that the SD is
to participate in the screening of prisoners in order to
have possible unsuitable elements segregated. This order
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was with respect to policies for the combatting of partisans.
The witness Fruechto was a physician at Dulag 160 in the
hear ^Vrea of Army Group South. At the prisoner of war
camp, he testified ^ the SD searched for commissars.
His testimony in this respect is as follows:
"To the best of my knowledge there was
a directive to the effect that prisoners
of war were to be screened for the presence
of Commissars and Politruks. In actual
practice it only happened very rarely. I
only remember two cases, since the Com
missars had, in most cases, been liquidated
before the prisoners had arrived in the camp
I only knoviT of tv/o cases, one in the Camp
Kirov/ograd v/here a man v/ho was charged with
being a folitruk v/as interrogated by a
Judicial officer and by the Commander. The
* second case which I recall occurred in the
. main camp OhorolJ where a non-commissioned
officer of the Field Police, when a column
of prisoners arrived at the camp, immediate-
-51 ly segregated one Commissar and shot him on
' the spot. He wanted him shot already in the
J camp, I happened to be in the camp at that
time, but I told him that nobody must be
shot in the camp. Thei*efore, •he took him
away,, had him undressed, took off his
clothes^ and had him shot at the next
corner
nd:JX
"I want to refer back to the other subject
matter. I don't believe I was understood
correctly- I didn't say then that only on
two occasions searches were carried out.
Of course, searches were carried out all
the time, but only in tv/o cases something
was actually discovered'. It was a matter
\ of course for the Gormri guards that every
incoming transport of prisoners of war was
' screened as to the presence of political
functionaries, but only on tv/o instances
something was actually discovered, as I
said, because in laost cases the people had
been liquidated prior to the transport
reaching the camp. I wanted to supplement
this statement to my last answer."
Dulng 160 v/horo Fruochto was mociical offloor, was
located at Chcrolj.. Fruochto's testimony is supportod by
that of tho witness Blumenstlok, who was an Inmte of
this camp, and testified that there was an order that
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comr.iissars, polltruks, officers and other staff workers
were immediately to be assembled in one groupj that on
one occasion while there, he, saw either seven or nine
people shot, and that among them wore prisoners of war,
commissars and tiiree Jev;s»
The Comraander of the Rear Area 'Array Group South, the
defendant von Roquos, is number four on the distribution
list of the order from the OKH which we next consider-
This order of 7 October 1941 definitely provides for the
SD to enter the camps in the rear areas, and there can be
no misunderstanding as to what was to happen to those whom
they segregated and removed from the camp. Among other
things contained In the order are the following:
•jrSonderkuramandos of the Seciirity
Police and Security Service (SD) will bo
set up, in accordance with the directives
enclosed herewith, in the transit camps of
the rear army area to segregate'on their
own responsibility unbearable elements.
"b) In agreement with the commanding of
ficers of the rear array area (district com-
ra^mdors for prisoners of war), the operations
of the Sonderkommandos have to be regulated
in such way that the segregation is effected
as unobtrusively as possible and that the
liquidations are carried out without delay
and at such a distance from transit camps and
villages as to ensure their not becoming known
to the other prisoners of war and to the popu
lation.
^ ^
"d) In the transit camps of the rear army
area in which a segregation by Sonderkommandos
could not yet be effected, procedure accord
ing tc previous regulations and under the re
sponsibility of tho camp cormtianders should be
carried on. Up^n arrival of the Special
Kornrnandos the segregation of unbearable elements
is exclusively the task of the latter.
Segregations executed jointly, etc., must
not take place.
"3. This order must not be passed on in writing
- not even In the form of an excerpt. District
ccmmanders for prisoners of war and commanders
of transit camps must be notified verbally,"
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It is apparent x'rem this order that it was considered so
bestial as to be fit to be seen only by those to whom it
was addressed, among whom was the defendant von Roques,
for it was forbidden to pass it on in writing, even in the
form of excerpts. It provides, as will be noted, that the
district commanders for pi'isoner of war and transit camps
must be notified verbally. Von hoques» hear ^rea Army Group
received this order for It was on the agenda for discussion
at the Commander's Conference in the Rear area Army Group
South on 17 November 1941 under the heading "Authority of
the SD in prisoner of war transient camps {new decree)."
V\/hether Roques saw this order is not material, for operations
were carried on in camps under his Jurisdlntlon and control in
accordance with it by the SD, who could enter such camps
only with his permission.
On 15 May 194S five hundred prisoners segregated in
•Culag 160 were shot. This is testified to by Dr. Rruechte,
camp physician at 160, His testimony on this oo-
cui'rcnce is as follows j
II Now, with reference to the prisoners
who were executed by' the SD in Dulag
160, how were they accounted for? Was
there any record ever made of what hap
pened to them, or, how they were checked
off, or, do you know the procedure?
It was as follov/s: The SD came to Korol
with the mission - I myself talked with
the SS UntersturmfUehror, a non-com
missioned officer; their mission was to
shoot all Jews and all other persons
who^were in some way suspects. Some 50
civilians had remained in Korol. Some
were craftsmen who were still needed.
In addition all prisoners of war had
remained in ivorol and a number of
persons v;ho were detained in the
prisoner of war camp as suspects, that
is a suspicion of being partisans,
Jews, gypsies, coimnunists, function
aries, etc. The SD first had all
Jews detained in the local prison in
Korol, all of them civilians; then the
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SS Untersturmfuehrer went to the
camp; In the camp a list had been
compiled by the camp management,
recording all persons who v/ere not Jews
but who were suspect. The Jews didn'tJ
have to be checked because they were
to be shot just as the Jewish civilians
v/lthout any formalities. The 3U Unter
sturmfuehrer then had two or three hun
dred suspects file past him on two days
and put on his list, behind each name
an I'F*, which denoted 'Free*, or an 'E',
which meant 'to be shot'. All persons
who were assigned an »F' were put to
gether with tho Jews and on the 15th of
May they were shot together with the
Jews .
"Q, And how many were there in all?
A. I already stated, a total of approximately
500: thus, there must have been 450 Jewish
prisoners of war and suspect persons from
the camp because 50 looal civilians were
still there in addition."
No comment is required on this testimony, .again the testi
mony of the witness blumenstick corroborated it, for he states
that he was marched from Chorolj, Oulag 160, to Kremenchug,
with 12,000 or 15,000 Hussian prisoners of war. Those un
able to keep up in the march were shot. Blumenstick tes
tified tiiat three were shot by his side because they were
exhausted and fell, and that he thought probably 1200 were
killed for this reason, i'huechte also heard from those of
the troops who accompanied thcise marches that the exhausted
prisoners of war were shot and left lying by the road side.
At the time of these occurrences at -^ulag 160 It was with
in the area of von Koques, ^11 of the foregoing incidents
occurred in the Rear Area of i-irmy Oroup South.
Those hereinafter noted occurred in the Rear Area Army
Oroup A, of which von aoques assumed command at the begin
ning of August as to part and 1 September 1942 as' to tho re
mainder of such rear area. The 454th O..vision, subordinate
- 248
to him shot two partisans for being oommunitsts, also
37 active communists. Part of this shooting was done by
the SD, though the report shov/ing it is a report of the
454th Division. From the foregoing documents and orders,
and oral testimony and other evidence in the record, there
can be no question but that defendant von Roques, if he
did not hand down the Commissar Order, received it and from
the beginning of the campaign knev; that it was being carried
out in his area.
2. Prohibited Labor of Prisoners of Viiar
Von Roques received the OKH order on 51 July 1941
v/ith respect to the allocation of labor, in which it was
directed that commanders in the Army Group Rear Areas Y/ould
carry out labor allocations in the interest of the operations
It was directed 4further that prisoners must be offered for
work to all large scale organizations, such as supply dis
tricts, road and bridge construction battalions, railroad
engineer relay points,"ground personnel units of the Luft
waffe, economic offices, organization TODT, and officers
charged with the construction of winter quarters. This
order probably was illegal in that it may have permitted
and authorized work not permissible under international
law. Apparently von •ttoques passed it down to his divisions,
but there is no evidence that prisoners were used except
for work such as clearing sno^r from roads and work of this
character. There is a picture that shows POlV's loading
ammunition at a point "which on th,- date of the picture
is not shown by the operational map to have been in von
•rtoques ' area. Other map? before and after show it in his
area, ^on Roques testified that no prisoners of war were
used for forced labor in his area. On the whole record.
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we are not satisfied that the evidence is sufficient to es
tablish the defendant's guilt of using prisoners of war for
prohibited labor.
3. Murder and Ill-treatinent of Prisoners of war. Generally
Von Roques denies that he distributed the ^oiiimando
Order, but paratroopers were shot as guerrillas in his
area. An order by the Chief of Staff of the Rear Area
Army Group South, bearing date of 9 August 1941, was
directed to be distributed to all departments. Apparently
the order was issued in reply to an inquiry about the treaty
ment of captured paratroopers. Statements conMncd In the
order are as follov/s:
"It has to be insisted that every para
trooper is a guerilla who, as a civilian, in
any v^ay opposes the Gorman Wehrxnacht and its
institutions.
"Ke is therefore also to be treated as
a guerilla on principle
"Only if paratroopers report to a German
headquarters on their own or have themselves
brought thore by Ukrainian militia to whom
they voluntarily surrendered will they be
treated as Prisoners of \/ar.
"Statements of captured paratroopers
that they were forced into this service are
not to be believed at all, since.these state
ments in all probability are made according
to orders.
"Only through ruthless measures can the
paratrooper plague be opposed succ^jssfully."
The defendant von Roques in his testimony said that his
troops understood this order in the way he intended it, which
was that paratroopers in uniform were not to be shot but
treated as prisoners of war. It will be observed that
there is no such exception contained In the order. Clearly
none was intended. Subordinate units understood it according
to its literal terras.
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A report oi' the director Jjicharge of the Field
Police la the • Rear Area of Ariny Group 103, which v^as under
Roques, shows the shooting of 49 parachutists as guerrillas.
The V/ar Diary of the 444th Secxirity Division, \inder
date of 21 March 1942 at which time the order of battle
shows it was subordinate to von Hoques, contains a report
of the shooting of nine "parachutists, saboteurs" by the
Field Police.
A report of the Einsatsgruppen, bearing date of IS
November 1941, contains the following:
. . , Among those executed by bondorkommando
4a in the second part of the month of October
1941 until the date of this report, in addi
tion to a comparatively small numbor of poli
tical functionaries, active communists,
poeple guilty of sabotage, etc., tne larger
part were again Jews, and a considerable part
of these wt^rc again Jov^ish prisoners of vjar
vmo had doen hanceel over ny the wehrmacht.
At feerispol^ at tHe request of the coim-iander
of the Borispol POw camp, a platoon of ^onder-
komi-nando 4a shot 752 Jewish prisoners of war
on 14 October 1941 and 357 Jewish prisoners
of war on 18 October 1941, amongst them some
commissioners and 78 wounded Jcv;s, handed
over by the camp physician."
Defendant von Roques stated that Borispol at this time
was in his area. It will bo observed that this action
occurred at the request of the camp commander. It will be
observed further that it was subsequent to the mass murder
by the SD on the 27th and 28th of July, to which we have
heretofore referred. Apparently at this time von ^oquea
had taken no steps to advise his prisoner of war commanders
that they were to have no further traffic with the SD,
A report of the Feldkoramandantur 194 to the Command-
General, Hear .^.roa Army Group South, on 13 Apr 11 1942
shows that 126 prisoners of war wore handed ovor to the
SD in Tschernlgow. viihlle von Roques testified that he
was on leave in Berlin and did not receive this report,
w© do not deem this material because at this time for a
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long period of time he had had knowledge that the SD vifere
a murder group, and it was his business with such know
ledge to see that prisoners of war were not turned over
to them. Ho had had ample time to do this before going
on leave-to Berlin,
Another occasion on which prisoners of war v/ere
murdered is.evidenced by a teletype which von Boques ad
mitted having read. It is a report of the 24th Infantry
I'd vision, dated 15 October 1941. Therein is contained the
following:
"Devoting every effort to the task, the
removal of prisoners proceeds according
to order. Insubordinations attempts to
escape, and exhaustion of prisoners make
the march very difficult, a.lready there
are over 1000 dead following executions
by shootin.^y, and exhaustion. In fxTexandrija.
no preparations have been made by PVv transit
camp lti2 for the permanont accommodation of
20,000. Novoukrainka, allegedly only for
10,000,"
On the same day that the above report was received, the
Commander-in-Ohief of the hear -H-rea Army Group South made
a report to the Array Group South in which is stated the
following:
"At 24th Inf, Div,. the march is made dif
ficult by insubordinations, attempts to
escape, and exhaustion of Pii/s. P'ollowing
executions by shooting and exhaustion
1,000 dead."
On the agenda for a Commander's Conference on 17 November
1941, under the heading of "Prisoners of Vifar" appears this
statement:
"Shooting to death by.24th Inf. Div. of
prisoners of war unable to march.
Countcrmeasures,"
Also appearing on tho agenda is the statement:
"Lt, General of the Infantry von Hoques,
the Coirimander of the hear Area Army Gpoup
South starts a two months furlough for a
cure. His deputy is Lt, General of Infantry
.-K-Prlederici
f- • •4',^ •• •• - •- "• •
•at fnV i'•
It is clearly indicated by this that on 17 November it was
known that the shooting of prisoners by the 24th Infantry
Division because they wore unable to inarch had occurred.
It is clearly indicated that von i'^oques was still in c oin-
mand on 15 October for he initialed the teletype of that
date and signed an order, commending the 24th Infantry
Division for its participation in the movement of prisoners^
under date of 26 October 1941•
The witness Blumenstick» who made this march, as'ia
prisoner of war, testified that three men were shot near
him because they were too exhausted to keep up with the
march. He testified further as follows:
"From ICorol to iiremenchug, we had to march
in groups of 20 men and 5 men in breadth.
The Jews v^ho had remained alive were to
head this group, then followed some Com
missars, another group of off icers • They
were guarded very heavily and then the other
nationalities followea on this march from
Korol to hremenchug. People who tried to
obtain some food were shot immediately,
whenever they deviated from the marching
formation to the ri^t or to the left.
People who were unfit to march, who couldn't
go on any more, v/ere shot immediately, and
were left to the right and left of the road.
They were lying prostrate with their faces
to the earth and with their hands stretched
forth."
As v/e prisoners assumed at the time, we
estimated the number between 1200 and 1500.
Can you tell the Tribunal how many
people were transported at that time?
"a. We estimated about 12,000 to 15,000."
Dr. Pruechte, who was medioixl oflicor at the prisoner of
war camp, testified as follows:
•
"I can only remombor one instance . ...
in which I know positively that on the
march prisoners of v/ar were shot, and this
march was the one- that took place in the
middle of October. I cannot recall the
exact date but it was directed from Ciirolj
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to Krementschug. The Camp Ghorolj was too
crowded and there was an order to trans
fer about 20,000 prisoners of war cross
country marching on foot to hrementschug..
I, as a camp physician, was ordered by the
camp manageiiBnt to make notes when t he
prisoners filed through the gates of the
camp and to segregate prisoners who looked
v/eak and exhausted. I did that, ^nd a
number of people of whom one could see that
they would not be able to physically with
stand the strains of the march I segregated.
Later on soldiers who either participated
in the march or others who passed the stretch
of road between i-Crementschug and Chorolj on
vehicles said that all people who were ex
hausted--"
"a. I said "that shortly after the march had
taken place, the personnel of the camp was
informed by soldiers, some of "whon had parti
cipated in the march as escorts, or by other
soldierswho had passed the stretch of road
where the march took place in some way or
other, that those people v;ho couldn't march
any further were shot. They also told us
that the corpses v/ere left at the road and
that the whole stretch of road up to Chorolj
was marked by the corpses left there.
"Q,. Can you tell the Tribunal why you were
ordered to segregate the woak people?
"A. So that only those people wore to parti
cipate in the march who would be able to
stand the strain of the mrch.
"Q. who gave this order to you please?
"a . The camp conmiandant. "
General von Tettau, who was in command of the 24th
Infantry Division, gave an affidavit in which, among other
things, he stated that he knew nothing about the shooting
of prisoners of war unable to march. Since he knew nothing
about it, he could not explain on cross examination how
the matter came to the knov^ledge of von j-""^oques so that he
could report it to ^rmy Group South. This affidavit is not
convincing oh this point. It is proper to state, however,
that the order given by Tettau which effected the transfer
of the prisoners concerning which Dr. Fruechte testified
is a clear and humane order.
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An order from the High Command of the Army specifically
states that security tasks in the Rear Area of the Army
and -"-rmy Groups embraces among other things "guarding and
transfer of piiscners of war, the allocation of prisoner of
war labor detachments." Von Roques as Goiiimander of the
Rear ^ea Army Group had control of the. prisoners of war,
and it was his duty under international law to provide and
care for them within his area and to treat them humanely.
Bearing the date of August 1941 is a report by Jackeln,
Sr. SS and Police Leader and Commander of an' SS Brigade,
giving an account of an operation. This report shows that
73 Russian soldiers were captured and shot as guerrillas.
As showing the general condition that prevailed in
#
the Rear area Array Group South, a report from von Roquos'
Array to the OKH, dated 20 December 1941, contains:
"Prisoners of Vvar
"The mss deaths of undernourished prisoners
of war in the Dulags (Transient camps) in
creasingly attracts unwelcome attention among
the civilian population. The mass of the
prisoners of war is unable to work due to
exhaustion."
^i.nother enclosed report shown in the same document,
dated 21 December 1941, sets forth graphically the
conditions of the prisoners of v/ar in the Rear Area Army
Group South:
"1.) On 20 December 1941 the total of
Prisoners of '^nar in the 4 Prisoner of
ii/ar camps located in the near i-^rea ^rn^
Group was: (Dulag ISO, 162, 205, Stalag 346}
52^515 Prisoners of
^ Mortality rate of Prisoners of Vi/ar
in the camps, to l.T
a) Dulag 160: Prom 12,959 Prisoners of
knar an average of 10 deaths per day
2S.02^q a year.
b) •i-'ulag 182: Prom 7,507 Prisoners of
war an average of 18 deaths per day
87.05^ a year.
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c) Dulag 205« From 9,271' Bfiso^ners
of 'War an average of 21 deaths per
82.06% a year,
i^talag. 346: From 22,776 Prisoners^ of
vvar an average of 50 deaths per day
80.1% a year,"
The testimony shows that many, in fact the greatep part^ of
the prisoners here referreu to were taken in the l^at^^les
of Kiev and Uman, which occurred in the middle of September.
This was six weeks before von noques temporarily loft thq- area.
Xt would not have been possible for the conditions indicated
to have grown up during the one month of his absence had
proper provisions been made for those prisoners. This oc
curred in the area over which von Koques had control and is
evidence of the gross neglect that v;as exercised in carrying
out the obligations of international law as expressed in the
Geneva and the Hague Conventions.
There is evidence in the record that von Roques re
turned on 10 January 1942, There is a report of the Com
mander of the Rear ^rea army Group South, dated
31 January 1942, which shows that conditions had not im
proved, and that in three of the I>ulags, which then con
tained an aggregate of approximately 30,000 prisoners,
they were dying at the rate of 106% yearly in one, 262%
yearly in another, and 254% yearly in the third.
Another report shows the general mortality rate in
February in fi.vo of the camps, containing 38,508 prisoners
of war, to have been 2,814 dead or 7.5 monthly. For the
month of March in the samo camps, out of a total of 42,078,
1707 dead were counted, or a mortality rate of 4.1%
monthly•
The chief medical officer with the Commander of Roar
^rea ^rmy Group South reports an inspection of the prisoner
of war hospital and the prisoner of war camps of Dulag 205
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and states that there are "impossible sani-tary oonditiions
and advanced starvation of prisoners of v;ar''.
^ report of the Commander of the Hear Area Army Group
South to the OKH iccuarterraaster General, which bears von
Roques' initials and is dated 1§ January 1942, states that
on 13 January 1942 there were 46,371 prisoners of war in the
camps. The lack of food is stressed and this statement
appears:
"Until 1 ^pril, therefore, the high mortality
rate will probably account for loss of 15,000
prisoners of war."
The report, which is signed by the chief of the General Staff
of the Hear Area j^rmy Group South, concludes with this state
ment ;
"There is no doubt that for the time being
labor allocation of these prisoners of war
who still are in the camps must be abandoned
almost completely. Only by this and by
simultaneous Improvement of food supplies
will it be possible to save at least a frac
tion of'the considerable labor potentiality
which lies in the prisoners of war. Other
wise, it has to be expected that about 46,000
prisoners who are now in the Rear ii.roa H. Gr.
South vi^ill have dissolved in a few months
from death and diseases."
No comment is necessary to show the extent of the neglect
of these prisoners. Von iioques was responsible for the
prisoners of war in his area during the time these con
ditions existed, as shown by the record in the case.
4. The Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order
y^e have discussed generally the character of this
order, which opened the door for much of the criminal
activity of the German army in Russia, Roques handed it
down to his subordinates. He says he emphasized the neces-
Ity of maintaining the discipline of the troops. It was
nt to his three security divisions, 213, 444 and 454, and
to 14 i^'eldkommandanturen.
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The 454th Security 151 vision, on. 2-«-iUgUst 1941,
ig^ued an order providing among other things, for the ar-
j*est of ciyilians and timt, ''If they appear in any way
suspect, they are to handed over by the PW trsnsien^;
can ps to the SD", and that, "In the rear area of the iu^my
Group they are t o be transferred to the EinsA-tzgruppen and
Konmiandos of tho Security Police and SD",
An order of the 213th Security Division, dated 22
•august 1941, contained the following:
"Civilians, who are sufficiently suspected
of espionage, sabotage, or partisan activity
are to be shot after interrogation by the
Secret I'ield P.'lice. hon-residents who can
not sui'ficiontly prove the reason for their
presence, should, if possible, bo handed over
to the SD comniandcs, or otherwise be trans
ferred to a prisoner camp for further action
by the SD Commandos. Young boys and girls
vjho are often used by the enemy, are not to
be excluded."
Not to be outdone by his divisions in implementing
in bloody fashion the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order, Roques
himself, on 23 -August 1941, issued an order in which the
following appears:
"In case weapons are still found, the offenders
will be punished according to the regulations
concerning guerillas v;ith capital punishment.
Should the participation of broad circles of
the population be probable, or if It is the
matter of an amiflunltion depot, an officer,
occupying the post of at least a battalion
CQjm-nander, v/ill order the execution of coT-
iective punishxiient, i.e. mass executions,
or that villages be burnt to the ground
partially or entirely. fhe latter shall,
however, be carried out only if the billet
ing of the units is not endangered. In
consideration of the Russian conditions
it is required that each superior exercises ruth
less measures for the security of the unit.
"The execution of collective punishraents will
be re
a spe
ported daily in the evening reports as
ecial event."
Later, on 21 March 1942, Roques* Chief of Staff issued
an order cautioning units in the combat zone about shooting
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those arrested for esponage, suspicion of espionage, sabot
age, 933 partisan activities without informing the Intcl-
ligenise officer of the Secret Field Polipe, because by so
doipg impor-feant; might not be pncovered or might
be lost. Roques, on his examination, pointed out that such
information would be lost "if those people are shot v/ithout
the Secret Field Police". The life of a suspect was of no
concern to the wbhrmachtj but the information vifhich the
Secret Field Police might extract from him was precious
and must on no occasion be lost. Koques testified at some
length that the Secret i^'ield Police did not shoot'suspects
unless the matter was passed upon by an officer of the rank .
of Lt. Colonel,, but he waverod so much that his testimony
is not credible on this point. Roques tiirned cases over
to the Secret Police andused them as his investigators.
Under such clro-umstances, it was his duty to direct and
channelize their action in such a manner that they did
nothing that he could not control. It was his duty to see
that his troops and the Secret Held Police which he used
in his area did not have and act within a sphere of com
petence derived from some other source that permitted
action by them that he was charged with a duty to soe did
not happen.
A teletype to Roques, dated 2 October 1941, initialed
by him, shows four suspects shot by the 215th Security
Division* ^ report of 25 January 1942 by the higher SS
and Police Leader of the Coirmiander cf the Rear Area ^rmy
Group South says that on 23 January four suspect individuals
were apprehended and "summarily shot". Roques says It was
qrderod by the lolic-e Leader on his own responsibility and
there was no reason for him to intervene, nor could he.
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other repQp'^s show that civilians and suspects were
shot without evep the minimum of judicial pi^tec-tion being
afforded them, but merely on the order of a troop or police
officer.
That Rogues knew of the criminal activities of the
Senior SS and Police headers and their units is conclusively
shown by an order issued by him under date of 1 September 1941,
which is in part as follows;
"3.) Executive measures against certain
parts of the population ( in particular
against Jews) are expressly reserved to the
forces of the Senior SS and Police Leader,
especially in those districts which have
already been pacified.
"The troops themselves will liquidate
on the spot only such natives as have been
proved or are suspected of having committed
hostile acts, and this only in compliance
with orders of olficers; collective measures
may be ordered only by an officer with at
least the rank of battalion commander. No
doubts can be admitted in this respect, -any
arbitrary shooting of natives including Jews
by individual soldiers and any participation
in executive measures of the Senior SS and
Police Leader must oe considered as insub
ordination and punished by at least discip
linary measures, unless court procedure is
required."
From the foregoing and a great amount of other evidence
in the case, we find hoques passed down the barbarossa
Jurisdiction Order; that he personally issued other orders
in implementation of it or pursuant to it that are criminal;
and that he bears responsibility for the acts of his sub
ordinate units acting under such orders, and for the acts
of other agencies acting within his area, which were criminal
and which tlxoy v^ero ablo to carry out only with his ac
quiescence and approval.
^ 260 -
li-jAilfcl I nitlrH. I
•;:
5. Hostages and Reprisals
viie Jiave commented generally on %he fact that the so-
called hpstase an4 reprisa^ orders an4 killings in this
case are not such in fact but merely terror threats and
killings.
Roques received an order from ^irmy Group."^outh on 1
Ocinber 1941, which he sav/ because he initialed it, which
directed:
"l.) .(-arresting hostages and all men not
residing in any villages near the railv/ay
line Rasatin-Fastovy-Sriiela-hnjeprepetrowsk,
possibly also near the lino i-^lexandrija-
Dnjepropetrowsk.
"2.) Hanging hostages at the railway tracks
in case of new acts of sabotage.
"3.) In case of further acts of sabotage,
complete evacuation of a strip 1-2 km wide
on either side of the railway line and firing
on every civilian approaching the railway
tracks.'
He immediately sent it on to his subordinate Fcldkomraandanturen,
V«e do not find from the evidence that hostages were
shot in i^oques' area. He says they v/ere not.
6. Ill-treatment and Persecution of the Civilian Population
kany of the documents heretofore set forth show ill-
treatment and persecution of the civilians in -^^oques' area
of command. Other documents show the establishment of
ghettoes for the Jev/s; requirements that they v/ear the Star
of David; prohibition of Jewish rites; confiscation of
Jewish ritual articles; requirements that Jews surrender
all foreign exchange securities, precious metals and precious
stones; terror killings of suspect partisans and partisan
sympathisers; so-called mopplng-up exercises and turning over
of Jews and Communists to the SD; orders by hoques himself
that the troops shall not participate in "arbitrary shooting"
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of Jews and the executive measures of the SD; orders that
all headquarters shall help the SD detachments in carrying
out its orders from the Reichsfuehrer SS, other than taking
part in exeputiops; and that "the right to pbjept does not
exist for the ^bordinated headquarters with regard to
measures par:pied out by the SD detachments.'' Such orders
show beyond doubt the complete subservience of the '^uehrraaeht
in Roques ' area to the SD and its full cooperation v/ith the
SD program, with knowledge of its debased and criminal
character.
7. Partisan i*arfare
Krfith respect to partisan warfare in the light of the
loregoing documents and orders set out, we need only say
that'the execution of partisan suspects and other civilians
not franc-tireurs was a regular and continued practice in
Roques' area.
On the matters hdrein pointed out, l and the. record, .in the
case, we find the defendant von -^^oques guilty on Counts
Two and Three of the Indictment.
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Kermsjin Reinecke vias born in 'niittenberg on 14 February
1888. Re was a career officer in. the 3-erman Army and served
in the first IVorld .-iar as a captain in an infantry regiment.
After the end of the war, he held various positions until
1938'vhen he was appointed chief of the newly activated of
fice group, G-eneral VJehrmacht Affairs (Ah'A). In 1959 this
group was renamed General hehrmacht Office "(AwA) and Reinecne
became office chief which position he retained until the end
of the war. He was promoted to Brigadier General in 1938;
to Major General in 1340; and to Lieutenant General of the
Infantry in 1942.
In addition to his duties as chief of AwA, in December
1343, by ^ Fuehrer Order, he was appointed cnlef of tne
National Socialist Guidance Staff of the OKh".
Re received the Golden Party Badge in January 1943 and
the Hitler Youth Honor Insignia on 30 January 1944. He s'Cabes
In his affidavit that in 1944, Hitler ordered that bearers
of honor insignia would become automatically party members
so that this order affected him in the fall of 1944.
Aside from the charge of Crimes against Peace, hereto
fore disposed of In this opinion, we think that charges under
Counts Iwo and Three of the Indictment may be' disposed of unaer
the follo^-ang headings: (l) Segregation and Murder of Pri
soners of h':r; (2) Ill-treatment of Prisoners of \hr; (3) The
Commando Order; (4) Prohibited Labor of Prisoners of
(5) Looting; (6) Murder and Ill-treatment of Civilians, ie
shall discuss these charges in serial order.
1 Se'^ re=-:ation and Murder of Prisoners of war.
f-e record in this case establlsned numerous and far-
reaching crimes by the Third Reich and its leaders committed
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against prisoners of war. These concern not only Russian
prisoners of war but other allied prisoners of war. The
evidence in this case establishes the use of French pri
soners of w?r in the manufrrcture of arms contrcry to the
G-eneva Convention which was binding upon G-ermany as to
French prisoners of war. It is -alleged that this was done
by agreement with the ambassador of the Vichy Government to
Berlin. There is no evidence of any agreement by the Vichy
government in this case.
This matter wps considered in both the cpse of the
United States against 1-iilch and the case of the United St;.tes
against Krupp, et al, both of which Tribunals held such use
illeg-1. We are of the opinion, for substantially tne rea
sons cited in the Krupp ca.se, that if any such agreement
existed, it was contrary^to international law. Certainly a •
conquering power cannot set up and dominate a puppet
government which barters away the rights of prisoners of
war vhiile the nationals of that country under substantial
patriotic leadership are still in the field.
Concerning Ruseism prisoners of w-r the evidence
establishes a series of colossal and s-tupld crinos under tho
Third Reich. Hundreds of thousands, millions, were drooiiiod
to die through neglect or were hilled by ill-treatment or
deliberately executed by the agencies of the Reich govern
ment in order to exterminate the so-called bearers of com
munist ideology, the"unfi"d', Jews, and others. The record
also shows shooting of Russian prisoners of w^r v/ho attemp'ced
to escape nd were recaptured, and the ora.nding of Russian
prisoners of war.
This Tribunal, from the evidence in this case, finds
that such uses of prisoners of v•^^r and tne treatment of
prisoners of war outlined above constituted intern^itiori-"!
crimes. It now becomes our duty in this case to determine
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the connection, if any, of the defendant Helnecke, with sucn
crimes from the evidence before us.
The authority exercised by the OO over prisoner of ''.r
affairs did not extend to oemps within the operational ai-es.
of the OICH or to camps of the air force and navy. In tnese
camps the appointment of personnel and disciplinary povjer
was exercised by the various services. In the Reich Com
missariat the camps %-Jere under the jurisdiction of the Armed
Services Commander, a subordinate of the 00; also prisoner
of war camps within the Helch and the C-eneral Government were
under 0K:7 jurisdiction except as to disciplinary powers v/hioh
in the Reich were exercised by the commander-in-chief of tne
Replacement Army.
The organization of Prisoner of vVar Affairs in tne
is shown by the chart of G-eneral Westhoff, Chief of Prisoner
of Vlrr Affairs in the OK;J. Subsequent to the eppointment
of Inspector of Prisoner of wg.r Affairs it is shown by the
cha.rt of G-eneral Rottig, Inspector G-eneral of Prisoner of ^
>/ar Affairs,
The QIC;, within the Relcn, controlled the appointment
of District Prisoner of VJ-r Commanders, C^mp Commanders, and
other personnel of the Prisoner of vvar Administration and
conducted training courses to prepare such personnel for their
tasks although the actual appointment of this personnel was
made by the army personnel office.
The Commanding General of the Service Commands exer
cised a dual function:, one, as Commander of Service Commands
subordinate to the OKh; ard the other as Commander of Troops
suborciinhto to the Replacement Army, but his Referent for
Prisoner of ha.r Affairs was the Commander of Prisoner of
War Affairs in the Service Gomraand, who In turn was a superior
of the v/.riouB camp commanders. The control of the OK.'J over
i
*- 265 -
... ...
4
... i i rfrtlli'iii'ii I'lH nlifi' i i n' 'mi n'''! Vi' ' '"
-'-.T
prisoner of Wfr camps and their personnel is sho\^?n in the
document pertaining to the Meinel affair^ It is also shovm
"by the testimony of the affiant 'vestrem wherein he states
in pertinent p.?rt as follows:
*fThe controls from above (OKVi, Commanders
of the Prisoners of Vlar, Ocmmander of the P.Wi
Base Camps,, the competent Battalion Commanders,
whose Company Cpmmanders and officers travelled
around at all times) * * *",
When he testified on the stand, he stated;
"I am of the opinion that the OKW/AV«A
was the agency charged with de'^ling with
prisoner of war matters,"
The defendant vja.s the chief of the A'.jA. One of the
most important sub-sections of this office v?as that of
Prisoner of har Affairs, and the evidence establishes the
general control and responsibility of the defendant over
these matters within the Reich, the G-eneral Government, the
Reich Comraissarlat, and other areas under the OK.v.
On or about July 1943, the General Inspector of Pri
soner of War Affairs was appointed and was directly subor
dinate to Keitel and not to the defendant. Notwithstanding
this fact, the testimony of Adolf -westhoff, Chief, Prisoner
of VJar Affairs in the OKW, shows that this General Inspector
reported concerning conditions of prisoner of war aff-^irs
to the Chief of Prisoner of War Affairs under the defendant.
It also appears from the evidence that there were other of
ficers who acted as inspectors of prisoner of vrar camps for
the A"iA and who reported directly to the Chief of Prisoner
of Jar Affairs under the defendant Reinecke.
This orgf^'nlzatlon of prisoner of va^r matters remained in
effect until Hlmmler became Commander-in-Chief of the Replace
ment Army sometime in September of 1944, but apparently the
change in prisoner of war matters did not take place until
October of that year. After this period a great many of the
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important functions regprding prisoner of war affairs were
transferred from the AWA organization to Berger who operated
directly under Himmler. The situation after this change is,
shown by a chart of Colonel Fritz Keurrer, former Chief of
Staff under Berger.
Concerning prisoners of war in the camps under his
Jurisdiction, the defendant Keinecke issued many directives.
Whether ov not these instructions were designated e.s''direc
tives'' such "directives" issued "by the OKW v/ere orders and
binding upon subordinate units to whom they were directed.
This is shown by the testimony of many witnesses, including,
that of G-eneral VJestrem, former Commander of Prisoners of jl.r
in Wehrkreis XII, G-eneral Schemmel, former District Commander
of Prisoners of War, VJehrl^reis XIII, General Westhoff, and
numerous other witnesses, both of the prosecution and defense.
The testimony of the defendant himself also shows that xiis
directives were considered by him as orders binding upon tixe
units to whom they were directed.
We are not concerned in this case with the fact that tne
defendant did not have direct command authority or discipli
nary authority over the personnel of camps or units of the
army. He issued the over-all directives in the name of tne
OKVJ and the Comraander-ln-Chief of the OKW, with which they were
compelled to comply. The evidence in tnis case shows tnat tne
defendant exercised direct authority over 'Wehrkreis XIII.
That he by-passed the chain of command as stated in the testl-^
mony of General Schemmel is immaterial.
The defendant contends that such directives were aln.oys
issued "by order" of his superior, Keltel, and in this re
spect the evidence on the vjhole bears out his contention but
that fact does not absolve the defendant for responsibility in
connection with such directives, Chief of the AWA wr.s not
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a stenographer -who merely'- transcribed the orders of his
superior and passed them on. Keitel undoubtedly had a
secretary i-lio performed that function.
"The record in this case contains page after page of
voluminous orders transmitted over the signature of the
defendant by order of heitel. The fact is that it Kas one
of the defendant's major functions to draft and prepare or
ders for submission to Keitel for his approval (or sign in
his name orders in conformity with his known policies).
That this procedure was followed is shown by the testimony
of G-eneral Westhqff, reproduced on page 55 of the defen
dant's brief, where he stated:
"I wrote out a. draft t^cree in ac
cordance with the G-eneva Convention and
sent this draft to Creneral Heineche.
Gener'^l Reinecke sent back this draft de
cree to me after he had made a few im
provements in it; he turned sentences
around, etc., and then he ord.ered me to
send the draft to the various ministers
for checking purposes."
and where he states further:
"Then the draft had to be submitted
to the Party Chancellory. The Party
Chancellory thereupon announced that the
draft in no way corresponded with their
demands; that it must be altered, and the
Party Chancellory then altered about
70 per cent of this draft themselvcvS. This
new draft I then received back again by
the AViA with the order to 'submit the de
cree in its form as it was tnen, and to
submit it for signature."
The statement of the witness Kattner, secretary to the
defend nt Keinecke, also cited in the defendant's brief,
states;
"As a matter of principle, these things
were like this: The draft of such an order
would be pre-o-^red In tne prisoner of war de
partment; would then be submitted to the
Fieldmarshal :^nd be initialled by nim and
he would niso put a date tnereon. Then
this drs'ft was returned to us and was
coplecL out and signed by G-ener 1 j:\einecke,
'I.A, ~ Im Auftrage - by order of',"
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In other words, her testimony wes to the efiect un.--o
j Kt- subordinr-tes
the drv-.-fts of these orders were prepsred oy
of General Heineche before they were Bubmit'cea to Fie
1 It is not even
ivi^^rshrl Keitel for his signature or approvai-.
-L 4- --wnradure til:"'t W....ei.'6
to be presumed according to normal sta^f proce
the ideas expressed in the order carried out a policy o^.
Keitel laiovn to the defendfint, that K.eitel saw and nppi
such orders before they were issued. 1'^ i- noteo
in this connection that while the office of tj.*e Aw'A
located in Berlin, ' Keitel undoubtedly remained con
stantly with Hitler's headquarters in the east, hany of
directives signed by the defendant do not bear heitel's
initials or signature, showing they were seen and approved
by him as is the usual procedure where sucn is t.^e f.-ct.
In fact, Bxlaibits 366, 411, 371, 1243, 363, 210, and 232
show neither Keitel's initials nor his signature.
These matters have been heretofore discussed in ohis
ojjlnion and the defendant in this case cannot escape re
sponsibility for decrees Issued under his signature merely
by the fact that they were issued "by order*, defen
dant, in his own testimony, concedes tnat many of idc.-S
therein contained were hie own but these, according to .lis
contention, were always the beneficial provisions, a conten
tlon witm which this Tribunal is not impressed in vlow of all
tho ov^ a.lleged by the defendant that ne could visit
prisoner of war c^mps only with the permission of the
Commander-in-Chief of the Replacement Army. This defense is
considered without merit. '.Whether he and his subordinates
formally obtained such permission is immaterial. If sucn a
requirement existed, it was a mere formality.
I'he defendant's supervision and control of prisoners
©f war exi^ prisoner of war a,ffairs is also shown by the
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testimony of G-eneral von V/estrem, who stpted;
"I am of the opinion that the OKW/A^i/A
wns the agency charged with dealing with
prisoner of war matters,^'
Ke further stated:
"Xes, A^h^, that is, the Department
for Prisoners of War, did use extensively
its right to control the prisoners of war
and the work in their camps. That was
done in the first place by G-eneral -tveinecke
himself, who visited me twice, then by the
Inspector of Prisoner of Wpr hatters who,
in behalf of the A'vA, was constantly travel
ling. It was also done by individual officer:
on the staff of the AWA who, by surprise,
came to visit labor .detachments and prisoner
of war enclosures."
The evidence establishes that he made Inspections him
self and that the camps were constantly being inspected by
his subordinates. Inspection of such camps and knowledge
as to wht occurred within them was a function of the de
fendant. Westhoff testified that the Bspector of Pri
soner of VJar Affairs was subordinate to the A'.'iA and could
inspect camps within the jurisdiction of the A'.jA.
A Heinecke exhibit, an affidavit by Rudolf Schleier,
shows that the right to-inspect wns vested in the defendant.
This Tribunal is not concerned with fine formalities
or divisions of authority. The evidence establishes over
whelmingly the over-all control and supervision of the
defendant Reineoke as to prisoners of war under the supreme
authority of the OKW and his power over prisoner of wr.r
camps and prisoner of war affairs. The evidence shows
that he exercised that authority by issuing orders; that
he had the right of inspection both in himself and hie
subordinate; th^t such Inspection was a duty entrusted to
him and carried out by him; that he had the sources of
knowledge and the duty was placed upon hira to know and super
vise -..ha.t took place in these camps, and that he did Imow
and supervise what took place therein and directed certain
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operations in such camps.
As heretofore stilted, it is estcholished that prisoners
of T^ar vrere segregated snd liquidated under the progrpni of
the Third heich. The process of segregation and the re
sultant executions have been shovn to have been carried out
primarily by the SIPO and SD units sent to the c.->mps.
The defendant has denied knotuledge of tnis segrer'ation
and liquidation program of prisoners of war under rxis
jurisdiction. The knowledge of the defendant, nis approv:!,
a,nd cooperation with this program of murder carried ouc oy
Hiramler and his police, oarticularly by the SIPO and bD is
established from evidence too voluminous to recite in de
tail in this opinion. Broadly speaking, however, tne
sources of evidence may be classified under various he^-d-
ings; first, the directives and reports of the SIPO and SO
through their ovm channels in which they refer to agreements
with the OICW as to their operations. These documents, it is
true, did not go through military channels, nor were the
specific stgreoments with the OKW set forth, and some of 'Cxa.e
a.greements referred to are antecedent to documents intro
duced in evidence which show the official s.ction of the
A'M arid OICJ in regard to operations of the SIPO and SD in
prisoner of •''^ ar camps. However, tnat such agreements did
in fact exist is not only shown by these SIPO and SD docu
ments, but from the fact that in view of the responsibility
of the OiCVJ and AWA over prisoner of war affairs and pri
soner of w-r Camps, the activities of the SIPO and 3D
could not have taken place without the assent of the OlOt
and Ah'A.
host certaAnly this sogregption and liquidation pro
gram w;.?.s known to the commanders of the various camps where
the setreg^Alon took place and to Vc>rious other military
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officic-'.ls within these cramps. The evidence in this case
discloses not only thnt it was the duty of the defendant
1
to hnow what took place within them but that in fact
from constrnt inspections by his subordinates and which
he made himself, he could not have escaped such 3£nowledge.
Not only did he have this power and duty of inspecting
but it is also established by the evidence that at con
ferences which he called for the camp commanders, he was
in contact with personnel who knew very well what x-:as tak
ing place within their camps as to segregation and liquida
tion.
(
Another source of evidence which the defendant had
a.s to this program.was the various conferences which he
is shown to have had with SS Obergruppenfuehrer Kueller
who represented Himmler and the RSHA in carrying out this
liquid.-tion program. The x-jitness. Otto Bra.utigan, Liaison
Officer between the Ostministerium and the OKw Wehrmacht
Operational ,Staff, has testified to one such conference
between Heineoke and hueller where the liquidation of pri
soners of war was openly discussed. He testified that he
took to the conference the orders of the SIPO and SD
pertaining to this matter and that these o!rd.ers were brought
to the attention of the defendant. Certain conference notes
of Kinisterial Councillor Dr. Letsch show discussions of
liquidation of prisoners of war who had been segregated for
that purpose. Another conference between Reinecke and SS
Obergruppenfuehrer Mueller and others was attended by
Edwin Lahousen, Chief of Counter-intelligence, Department
IX, as the representative of Admiral Canaris sont to protost
Dgrinst this program and the witness, Lahousen, testified
that not only was the matter discussed but that the defen
dant si^-'T-ified his approval of the program of Mueller as to
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segregT.tion and llquida.tion of prisoners of war,
Tlae defendant denies any sucii conference but tiie evi
dence, including tii^it of his own witnesses, supports the
testimony of Lahousen.
A final and most convincing source of evidence on this
point is found in the documents signed by the defendant him
self. Sxhibit 363 shows an order of the OKW, dated 8 Septem
ber 1941, distributed "by order" over the signature of
Heineche, providing for cooperation of the camp authorities
I
with the SIPO and SD. • •
Sxhibit 411, dated 24 harch 1942, over Reineche's signa
ture, shows the segregation prograti of the Rinsstsgruppen
and the cooperation prescribed for camp commanders with the
SIPO and SD. ^ •
A decree of 5 May 1942, signed by Reinecke, shows pxi
agreement by him and tlie Reichsfuehrer-3S in connection
with segregation and refers to the "eliminations". This
agreement was intended to avoid a, double screening and pro
vided that thereafter the screening would be east of the
old Reich frontier.
Another decree signed by Reinecke is dated June 1942.
This decree is termed "Policy regarding Commissars and
Politruks"' and provided for the "elimination" of commis
sars and Politruks wnile within the Oeneral G-overnment. It
further provided:
"Within the (leneral Govt., the elimi
nation shall be carried out as'before by
the Security Police according to directives
given by ordinance Az.2 f 24.'73 AwA/Pri-
soners of '.l-^r Clen. (la) Ho. 389/42 g, dated
24 March 1942. Those sought out by the.SD
commissioners shall in future be conveyed
to Security Police camps specially prepared
for tills puroose in the Gen. Govt. or in the
Reich and remain in custody there. Special
tre-'^tment, as hitherto, will no longer be
given, unless peoole are involved who have
been convicted of criminal acts such as murder
cannibalism and similar acts.
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"To n.cceler?te the proceedings the Secur
ity. Pplice sh.^11 reinforce their Einsatz-hom-
mrndos in the G-en. G-ovt."
This shows the use of the term "special treatment" and that
that tern clearly meant liquidation. Furthermore, the
testimony of many witnesses, including the defendant, him
self,- established beyond a reasonable doubt that the de
fendant hnew, participated in, and approved the segraga-
tion and liquidation program carried out by the SIPO and
SD as to prisoners of war under his Jurisdiction and the
evidence in this case establishes that that segregation
and liquidrtion were not confined to political commissars
but included many other classifications among the pri
soners of war, including the Jews. The evidence also
establishes that those sick and unable to work, prisoners
of vrar v/ho had escaped and had been recaptured, and pri-
soners of war of Polish and certain other nationalities who
had h-ad sexual intercourse with German women, were turned
over to the Gestapo, SIPO, and SD, and the defendant''s con
nection therexirith.
This Tribunal does not propose to enter into the
question of how these liouidations wrere c:"^rried out or their
precise number, Kor is it concerned with the fact that the
progrrm of the SIPO and SD was not entirely co-extensive
with the jurisdiction of the defendant. It" is shown that
it was carried out in camps under his jurisdiction by virtue
of directives Issued by him. Whether the unfortunates who
were segregated were transported to concentrntlon c/mnps
to be g-ssed or worked to de-^th or otherx\fise disposed of,
8S described so grnphlcnliy by the witness, Smolen, formerly
with the Political Reception Detachment at Auschwitz, ;.3.nd
the question of whether or not their deaths were reported to
the Wehrma.cht Inform^-.tion Center, WAST, an office undor
the AWA, as he also testified, or whether as described by
2^74:
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the witness, Ohler, former Inspector of the Nurnberg G-est?.po,
they were transported to the railroad station by the camp
authorities, chained -and taken into Da.chau, where, five at a
time, they were taken out, stripped of their clothing, and
shot by the Zinsatzkommando, is not the question. The te.ct
remains and is clearly proved 'that the defendant was an active
participant in the program of segregation and illegal liqui
dation of prisoners of war under his jurisdiction; that he
knex^^ prisoners of vrar turned over to the police agencies
were to be so eliminated; and that he arranged for turning
them over to such units for that purpose.
• Nor -are we concerned with the fact that having parti-
cipated in the ruthless policies of the Reich in the early
stages of the war with Russia v,Tith regard to Russian pri
soners of war, ultimately the leaders of the Reich
came to the conclusion that they were depriving themselves
of a. valuable source of manpower and thereafter relaxed In
a measure their program of extermination. This is a re
laxation for which the defendant or anyone else can claim
little credit at best, and according to the defendant's
testimony, he can claim no credit because he asserts tha.t
he never knew of the existence of any extermination pro-
/
gram In the first place.
For"the reasons above stated, we find the defendant
guilty of participation in the criminal segregation,of • ^
prisoners of war for liquidation of certain elements and
for turning others over to the G-estapo for confinement in
concentration c-mps or elimination as they saw fit.
2. Ill-treatment of Prisoners of VJar.
The record in this case shows various inflamatory
orders concerning prisoners of war issued by the defendant
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Nand his subordinates. These include Exhibit 1248 and Exhibit
336,
• On 24 March 1942 the OKW/Av-»A issued an order which the
defendant claims favorably modified pre-existing directives.
Kowever, the purpose of this order i^/as apparently to increase
the production of prisoners of war. This order contains
the following provisions:
"Ruthless and energetic action in cases of
uncooperativeness, refusal to work, and
negligence in work, especially toward Bol
shevist agitators, is to be ordered; insub
ordination or active resistance must be
completely removed immediately with a
we'-pon (bayonet, gun butt or firearms,
no sticks)."
This order directed ruthless and energetic action for uncoopora-
tivonoss", "refusal to work,'"negligence in work'i especially
^'tovrard Bolshevist agitators". This directive also provided:
"The decree concerning use of arms by the
armed forces is to be interpreted strictly.
Whoever does not use his weapon or does
not use it energetically enough in seeing
that an order is carried out is liable
to punishment," t
On 19 August 1942 Reinecke signed a decree. This order
was distributed by the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plpn
and the Plenipotentiary G-eneral for Labor Allocation. This
order states:
"During these visits it should be
mentioned that a further OKw decree pertain
ing to the treatment of Russian PVJ's in
case of refusal to work will follovx soon.
Furthermore, Inquiries are to be made if and
where it has become known th-'t guards have
neglected their duty in supervising the
work output of PW's. In case this is as
certained, the most drastic steps are to be
taken.
"For 10 September 1942 reports will be
submitted to the OKW confirming that all
i\^SDAP functionaries (Hoheitstraeger), in
whose districts (Bezirke) PVJ's have been
allocated to work, have received the decree
referred to, and where disciplinary action
has been taken against guards who have
neglected their duty."
order shows party interference and influen
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Upon the defendant in connoction with his treatment of
prisoners of war and. also directs vigorous moasuros in
case of refusal to work and to incroaso the work out
put of prisoners of war#
On 29 January- 1943 von Gravonitz, a subordinato
of Hoinocko, signed and distributod an order extending
the r}0\'ioT to inflict punishments upon prisoners of war
for o.ttacks upon the state, Tliis order v/as dis-
/
tributod by the Party Chancolloiy to various Go.uleltors#
On 17 August 1944 an 'OIUI docroo, signed by
Roinecko, concerning the treatment of prisoners of war,
a.gain shows tho party influonco upon the defendant in
regard to this matter. Pertinent parts of this
order road as follows?
"«.(,Tho prisoners of war must dofi-
nitoly knov/ at all tir:ios that they
will bo ruthlessly procoodod against,
if necessary with weapons, if thoy
slack in their work, offer passive
rosista.nco, or oven robel-.o"
paragro.ph 5 provides
"..•Rinor cffonsos by tho guard a.nd
auxiliary guard personnel in the
treatment of prisoners of war arc
not to bo prosocutod if thoy sorvo
to holp incroaso production#,#"
pa.ragraph 6 provides as follows 5
ja;;
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^ *Th.e guard and auxiliary guard personnel
must therefore be briefed on political views
as often as 'possible. The commanders of pri
soners of war in the -n'ehrkreis are responsible
that officia,! NS political officers are speedily
assigned to all men's prisoner camps.* * *"
This paragraph clearly establishes that the ruthless policy
of the Party as to treatment of prisoners of war in work
piroduction was put into effect by the defendant. Reinecke.
In addition to assisting in the liauidation by the
SIPO, SD and Gestapo of "undesirable elements" among ori-
soners of war, the exhibit above cited discloses that the
defendant directed that the remaining prisoners were to
work under the merciless lash of the Party. For such in
human orders and abandonment of prisoners of war under his
jurisdiction to the supervision of a ruthless civilian
agency, of whose nature and purposes he was advised and
which he claims to have resisted, the defendant Reinecke
is criminally responsible.
It is small wonder from the above cited directives
that General Schemmel testified to the effect that the
mortality rate of Russian prisoners of war engaged in heavy
labor at hurnberg was very high.
3. The Commando Order.
The evidence in this case is not considered to establish
beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant's connection with
the execution of the Commando Order.
4, Prohltibited Labor of Prisoners of War.
The witness, Henri Bousson, former French prisoner of
war in '•lehrkrels VI, establishes the Illegal use of French
war within Reinecke's jurisdiction in theprisoners o
manufacture of artillery weapons in the Krupp plants.
- 278 -
4
,r»<
'• • .'i • ; -V'.. • •'-V
It is also established by Westhoff's testimony that
he called the use of French prisoners of war in armament
work to the attention of Reinecke and advised him that it
was contrary to the Geneva Conventions, to which Reinecke
replied that an agreement had been reached with Ambassador
Scarpini and the French Government permitting such use.
This and other evidence in this case clearly establishes
the illegal use of French prisoners of war in the manufacture
of arms and munitions and the defendant's know^ledge thereof.
That Reinecke was responsible for this use of prisoners of
war is shown from the record which, as heretofore pointed
out, establishes authority and jurisdiction over prisoners
of war within the Reich. Reinecke's control over such pri
soners of war is also shoxiin by Sxhlbit 230, wherein Goering
on 4 November 1943, stated;
"•» * *The Italians (Italian military,
internees) get beaten up when they do
not work. If Reinecke cannot do the
work, I shall dismiss him and get
somebody else.''* *
and by a meeting of the Central Planning Board wherein
Field Marshal Milch stated:
"Gablenz, I want you. to get in
touch with Reinecke concerning these
Frencli. I demand that if the people re
fuse to work they immediately be placed
against the wall and shot before all the
other workers. * •*"
Fnlle the proof in this case establishes many u^es of
Euss ian prisoners of w«r and while it establishes that
they were used to replace French prisoners of war for use
in the armament industry, it fails to establish the actual
use of Russian prisoners of war in the manufacture of arras
snd munitions.
5. Looting.
On 1? September 1940 Keitel issued an order to the
military commander in occupied France providing for the
illegal seizure,of property and its transfer to the Reich.
This order in pertinent part reads as follows:
"Reichsleiter Rosenberg and/or his
deputy Reichshauptsellenleiter Ebert has
received clear instructions from the Fuehrer
personally governing the right of seizure;
he is entitled to transport to Germany
cultural goods which appear valuable to him
and to safeguard them there. The Fuehrer
ha.s reserved for himself the decision as
to their use.
"It is requested that the services in
question be informed correspondingly."
On 10 October 1940 Reinecke wrote to the Supreme Com
mander in France and requested that the directions given
in the above directive of Keitel's be transmitted to the
military administration in Belgium.
On 50 October he addressed a communication to the
Armed Forces Commander in the Netherlands, supplementing
this order of Keitel's, a copy of which he sent for informa
tion to Keichsleiter Rosenberg.
For his connection with this looting program of the
Third Reich, he is considered criminally responsible.
6. Murder and Ill-treatment of Civilians.
VJe do not feel that the proof In this case establishes
beyond a reasonable doubt the criminal participation of
the defendant in the screening and turning over of civilians
to the SIPO and SD, or that he in f--^ct had authority over
civilians.
There has been much discussion in this case concern
ing the defendant's assignment as Chief of the Kgtional
Socialist Guidance Staff of the OKVJ for the purpose of
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fostering the Kazlficf^tion of the various services, particu
larly of the army. But the fact remains that the indoctrina
tion of the array in the Nazi ideology, repulsive as that
Ideology might have been, does not in itself constitute an
international crime, and the fact that he was appointed eaid
carried out such functions is not considered to have any
significance in this c.^se other than as it Indicates his
Gonforvaity to the ideals of Hitler and Keitel whose orders
and directives he is shown to have formulated and transmitted,
and his relation to Bormann and the Party to whom he in a
measure surrendered the supervision and treatment of prisoners
of war.
It has also been established that he was a member of the
People's Oourt as one of the lay judges thereon and that
he sat in the trial of the conspirators of 20 July 1944 where
the contemptible Freisler presided, which is perhaps the
most infaaious travesty on human justice ever so completely
recorded in the annals of man.
The fact, however, that he was a .member of the People's
Court and sat in this trial does not constitute an inter
national crime and is of no significance in this case other
than it reflects his character as a trusted and supine
instrument of Hitler's will in any capacity.
For the reasons above stated in this Judgment, we
find the defendant guilty under Counts Two a.nd Three of the
Indictment.
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WrtLTER Vv^^tRLIMONT
Walter Warliraont was born on 3 October 1894. He saw
service in World iiwar I in the artillery as a combat officer.
At the end of 1920, upon his own application, he v/as taken
into the neichswehr, I'Vom then on he served in various
capacities and in 1929 was detailed to the United States
Army to study the econoralc mobilization system. Later on
he served in various capacities, and in April 1,933 v^as
transferred to the Heichswehr Ministry in Berlin, Arn^ Arma
ment Offico, as Group Chief in the Economic Department. In
the suiiimer of 1954 he v;as appointed chief of this department.
At the end of August 1936 he was sent by the Reich Minister
of War von biomberg, as Military Plenipotentiary to General
issimo Ei-anco in Spain, where he remained until November 1935
In October 1937 he Vvas given command of an artillery
regiment and in 1933, shortly after the Anchluss, he v/as
ordered to Vienna by Reitel, Chief of the OKW, to represent
the OiiW there. After a few weeks he returned to his regi
ment, On 1 August 1938 he was transferred to the OKW in
Berlin to become familiar with the position of Chief of
the Section of National Defense as a successor to Jodl.
At that time his chief task was to represent the OKvV in
ensuing conferences where the military occupation of the
Sudotenland was being arranged with the military representa
tives of Czechoslovakia and the signatory powers of the
Munich agrooment.
On 10 November 1958 ho was appointed Chief of the
Section of National Dofcnse and v/as at the same time chargod
with the affairs of the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operational
Office, which shortly before had boon activitated. In August
1939 Jodl returned to the OKW and took over the affairs of
the Chief oi'' the VVehrmrxht Operational Office and the defend
ant remalni:;d Chief of the Section for National Defense. On
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1 i^ugust 1940 he was promoted to .Brigadier G-eneral. The
first of January 1942 the office Chief of National Defense
was renamed Deputy Ohief of the wFST without incurring any
changes in its duties. On 1 April 1942 he was promoted to
Major General. On 1 April 1944 he was promoted to Lieuten
ant General of Artillery. The Department of National De
fense consisted of the following divisions:
A. Operations Section Army (OPH (I/h))
Operations Section Air Force (0PL{I/L))
Operations Section Navy (0PM(I/M))
B. quartermaster Section (Q,u. )
C. Organization Section (Org.)
vi/hen in January 1942 these sections v/ere directly incorporated
into the Vv'FST, under uVarlimont, Jodl explained 'w'arlimont' s
duties as follov/s :
"warlimont's principal activity was to assign
the entire work of the staff and to issue
directives for that work. He supervised every
thing, He received orders from me concerning
his work, discussed it with the general
staff officers, examined the drafts, signed
and sent them to me.
"Another special activity was his direct co
operation with i^'ield marshal KEITEL, concern-uiuii xL;!! -Pi xa lu n i ivcuxxjcj-uj ^ i.*
ing all the questions which I did not handle,
nnToviio "rVx-l/nV. ^ t ^ ^ 4. ^ ^ ^ ^ vno J onn —problems which did not concern me, I con
centrated almost exclusively on operational
problems. WhALIiviONT handled, without my
participation, any other administrative
questions in the occupied territories, any
economic questions, in short, all questions
which were not of an operational nature,
which had to be sent in the form of orders
by hmlTLL to tne other offices.
"as to operational questions, he prepared and
submitted them to me. as to others, he co
operated independently with iCmlTKL, who had
no staff of his own at headquarters, without
my participation, particularly as he was
better trained in fact for these matters (poli
tical and ecoiiO-iU.c questions), than for the
operational ones."
Warllmont Is charged under all four counts of the
Indictment. *^ince Counts One and Four have been eliminated
by the action of the Tribunal, the remaining charges under
- 28 3 -
Counts Two and Three may be summarized as charging the
criminal connection of the defendant with the following
subjects! (1) The Commissar Order; (2) The Commando Order;
(3) Prohibited Labor of Prisoners of viiar; (4) Murder and
Ill~treatment of Enemy Belligerents and Prisoners of war;
(5) deportation and Enslavement of the Civilian Population;
(6) Plunder of Public and Lpivate Property and vVanton De
struction; (7) Murder, Ill-treatment and Persecution of
Civilian Population, in which he is charged with: (a)
Criminal Connection with the Barbarossa urder, (b) Illegal
ibxecutions of tlie Livilian Population, (c} -discrimination.
Persecution, and Lxecution of Jev;s by the .vehrimicht and
Cooperation with J^insatzgruppen and SD, (d) Cooperation
with the -i^insatzgruppen of the Rosenberg Staff, (e) Re-
Ijrisals against families of -c'rench Officers, (f) The
Night and i'og Decree, and (g) Other Illegal Orders. These
vfe will take up in serial order.
1. The Commissar Order
Prior to the ^"^ussian campaign, Hitler had announced
at a conference of high officers and their military com
manders and their chiefs of staff his intention to wage
war on Russia, vhich would be a clash between two ideologies.
It would be necessary to fight a war of extermination; it
v/ould be necessary to forget the comradeship between sol
diers •
Subsequently on 6 May 1041 General iviueller of the OKH
sent a letter to the Lhiof of the OiCWj marked attention
warlimont or his deputy, inclosing a draft of the directives .
for the treatment of political functionaries. This draft
was the first pertaining to the so-called Commissar Dicier,
warlimont sent this to the defendant Lehmann, who, after
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ta telephone conversation with yi«arlimont on 8 May, re
turned an amended draft after ]:^aving 9rossed gut Pc^raj^
-i ^ ' V * ' ? '
graph III and suggested the fgllowing ^ut^tituted
as a new paragraph III;
"The courts-martial and the drumhead
courts-martial of the regimental and
other commanders, must not be charged
with the execution'of the measures indicated
under I and III".
The note of transmittal is signed by lehmann. On 12 May
Vii'arlimont submitted a memorandum concerningtiais matter to
Jodl, which shows the OKH draft as altered by Lehmann.
'-••his reads as follows;
" IJL • • • • •
"l. Political functionaries and commissars
are to be removed. '•
"2. Insofar as they have been captured by
troops, an officer wdth disciplinary power
^ shall have a final decision as to whether
I the prisoner in question is to be ranoved
4 or not. It is suffigient to determine
whether the prisonei^'is a political function
ary.
"3. Political commissars among troops shall
not be recognized as P'/vs and shall be liquidated
at the latest in the Transit PW Camps. No
, evacuation to the rear.
"4. Expert directors of economic or technical
enterprises shall be seized only if they offer
resistance to the German i^rmed Forces.
"5. 'J-he carrying out of military operations
must not be hindered by these measures.
Planned searcning and purging actions are
not comtemplated.
"6. In the army rear area, functionaries
and commissars, with the exception of
# political leaders among the troops, shall
be turned over to the Special Commitment
Squads (Einsatzkommandos) of the SD.
ft! "ll. On the other hand, memorandum No. 3
of x-teichleiter -^^osenberg provides that only
high and highest functionaries shall be
liquidated, since functionaries on the state
communal and economic level are indispensable
for the administration of the occupied territory."
This memorandum was signed by Warlimont, Vyarlimont in
jiis aifidavit of 14 November 1945 states as follows;
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"I recognize a dociiment entitled ^Directives
Regarding Treatment of ^-u-tliorized Political
Representatives of th.e nussian btate for th.e
Uniform-t^xecution of the Mission Received on
31 March 1941' which is an excerpt from a
proposed directive drafted by the OKEi and
dated 12 iviay 1941 (PS-884). '- '^hat document is
• a true and accurate statement of the proposals
made by the OiiH with respect to Soviet poli
tical' functionaries and military commissars
captured v/ith Soviet troops# I'hat document
states that political functionaries and com
missars among the Soviet prisoners of war are
to be eliminated. That document bears my
initials indicating that it had been sent to
my division in the 01^ and had been seen by
mo before submitting it to Ueneral Jodl, my
immediate superior# I added to the document
Parts II and III before submitting it to
General Jodl. In addition, on my ovm initiative,
I sent a copy of the document to the OIGV legal
department for information, expecting that
department to examine the entire question and
to render an opinion thereon to the Chief of
the OKiiif #." ,
On 6 June 1941 the so-called Commissar Order was dis
tributed to the OKH, OKL and the CRM, and certain offices,
with the request that it be distributed down only to the
army and air Rleet Commanders and that the -other.chiefs and
commanders be informed by word of mouth. The cover letter
is signed by the defendant. On 8 June this order was
distributed by von Brauchitsch with certain additional
clauses, which read as follows j
"To I Number 1:
'"action taken against a political
comrriissar must be based on t he fact that
the person in question has shown by a
special recognizable act or attitude that
he opposes or will in future oppose the
Ktfehrmacht.
"To I iNJumber 2;
"Political coriimissars attached to the
troops should be segregated and dealt with
by order of an officer, inconspicuously and
outside the proper battle zone.
The idea for the murder of prisoners of war in the
name of ideological warfare did not originate with jvarli-
However, the evidence establishes that he contributed
his part to moulding it into its final form. It was dis
tributed "by order" under his signature. There is nothing
to indicate that those contributions v/hich he made in any
way softened its harshness, and we find the defendant guilty
of a participating part in the formulation of this criminal
order.
2. The Commando Order
On 7 October 1942 Hitler made a radio speech in which
it was stated;
"All terror and sabotage troops of the
British and their accomplices, who do not
act like soldiers but like bandits, have
in futtire to be treated as such by the
German troops, and they must be slaughtered
ruthlessly in combat wherever they turn up."
On 8 October the defendant vt^arlimont apparently was in
structed by Jodl to put the announcement in the form of a
military order. The defendant alleges he was given de
tailed instructions with regard to the contents of the
order. On 8 October, Tippelskirch, a subordinate of the
defenda.nt and Chief of V/PST/Qu (IV), issued a memorandum
in which, after referring to the above radio announcement
by Hitler, it was stated in paragraph II:
"Supplementary thereto, the Deputy ^hief (vVFST)
Armed -forces operational Staff issues the fol
lowing order to Section Q,u, which is to be carried
out speedily:
"l) Iransposition into order-form.
"2) Similar to the narbarossa-order given previously,
this order too, must - in accordance with 1/VR and
counter-intelligence - bo very carefully con
sidered and worded. Distribution only as far as
the iirmies, from there only orally. To be destroyed
after reading,
"b) with regard to the contents of the order, the
following must be considered:
In those cases in which temporary arrest of
persons takes d^^ce in our interest, they must
be handed over through the counter-intelligence
to the SJj, after intensive interrogation at which
SD, too, must participate.
Under no circumstances confinement in prisoner-
of-v/ar cairps. Proceedings on the lines of this
order are later on to be taken against the
people from Norway."
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This memorandum also refers to a telephone call to Minis
ter ialrat Dr. Huelle, a subordinate of Lehmann (in Vi/R)
concerning mich the following entries were made;
''Members of terror and sabotage troops
of the fighting forces of Great Britain,
v/ho can be proven to have disregarded the
rules of honorable combat, are to be
treated as bandits;
"They must be ruthlessly eliminated in combat
or in flight.
"If military interests necessitate their
temporary arrest or if they fall into
German hands outside combat activities,
they must be taken to an officer for im
mediate interrogation,, and afterwards
be handed over to the SD.
"Custody in prisoner-of-war camps is
forbidden.
"He remarks further that the formulation could
only be based on the facts as they appear in
the press."
The significant part of this memorandum is contained
in Section 2 which contains the order of the defendant as
to this matter and which suggests certain procedure to
be followed and certain provisions that must be considered
in drafting the order. The defendant's contention that he
received detal led instructions as to what the order was to
contain is not borne out by the wording of these instruc
tions. In the first place, with regard to the contents of
the order, he s tates that "the following must be considered"
(emphasis supplied), which is not consistent with the con
tention ^that ho had detailed instructions from Jodl, Nor
is the substance of the order which he issued to Section
Qu. consistent v/itri such c.nitGnt-i'.-no
The defendant has also introduced a rather elaborate
and unconvincing defense to the effect that it was his in
tention to sabotage the order, firstly by conferences with
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counter-intelligence and the legal section of the OKT//,
and secondly to sabotage It by having counter-intelligence
cximine the persons captured on the theory that counter-
intelligence under banarls would see to it that they were
not executed.
In connection with the first defense, it is to be
pointed out that the instruction of the defendant was to
the effect that the order must be prepared speedily. As to
the second defense, the order of the defendant states that
the following must be cons: der^^d:
"In those cases in which temporary arrest
of persons takes place in our interest,
they must be hana^d over through tho
counter-intelligence to the SD, alter in-
tensi\'C intorrogc'.tion at which SD, too,
must participate.''
By 3 October 1j42 Intensive Interrogation had certainly
come to have a sinister significance, particularly when
carried out by the SB, wnich vms to participate in such
interrogations, and it is difxicult to understand how the
action of counter intolligonce was to sabotage the order if
tho SD was to be presc--nt. BiXamination of this aocuracnt can
lead to but one conclusion; that it does not bear out the
contention of the delendant of any intention of his part
to sabotage the order; and it further bears out the fact
that those provisions which wore to bo considered came from
tho defendant himself and rot from Jodl and certainly not
from tho radio speech of nitler, for those matters go be
yond the radio speech.
In th^ ligl'it ®f theso instructions of the defendant,
it is significant that the order itself as finally issued
contains the following;
"4.) If individual members of such commandos,
such as agents, saboteurs, etc., fall Into
the hands ol the military forces by some
other mcruns, through the police in occupied
t^rritorios for instance, they are to be
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handed over immediately to the SD.^Any
imprisonment under military guard, ^
PVY Stockades for instance, otc ., is
strictly prohibited, oven if this is
only intended for a short time."
Prior to the completed order which it is noted was
issued on 18 October 1942, only ten days after the matter
\7as submitted to the defendant, other proceedings were
had with reference to tho preparation of this order. On
9 October 1942 a teletype v^as sent to the foreign counter-
intelligence, inclosing a draft prepared by This tele
type Y/as signed "by order" •;iy:xrliraont. Certainly no time
v/as lost in either the prepc.ration of this dralt by ia/R or
its submission to counter-intelligence. This teletype also
states:
"A close examination - if necessary under
cooperation of the iteichsfuehrer SS - is
requested."
Surely the suggustion of a conference on this matter with
the Reichsfuehror SS cannot be assumed as a sabotage
measure. The draft submitted also contains provisions
pertaining to the ma"cters discussed heretofore in relation
to .Exhibit 124.
On 10 October a teletype was transmitted to the OKw,
ViPST, stating the objections of the foreign intelligence
office to the draft of the order submitted to it, and on
15 October a tel(jtypo to the OK.vApST signed by the
foreign intelligence office, making changes in its original
teletype, was tr..nsmittod.
on 13 October 1942 ci telegram, signed Canaris, was
transmitted to the iirmed a'orces Operational Staff (Qjvi)
Prisoner of war Affairs (i».) roltttive to tnis matter and
stating Canaris' objection to it.
On 14 October 1942 a file note was made by Tipp^is-
kirch with reference to a telephone conversation with the
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chief of the Vffi in which VvR requests a phone call to the
Deputy Chief of the Operational Staff and suggests a con
ference pertaining to the matter.
On 15 October 1942 a lettex* signed by uehinann was sent
to the Armed horces Operational Staff, Wt'ST, with reii^rence
to a previous telephone conversation and for information to
the foreign.Intelligence ofiice, discussing the subject of
the treatment of prisoners ol war in connnecticn with the
proposed Commando Order.
On 14 and 15 October 1942 various drafts pertaining to
the proposed doi-nmando Order were transmitted, apparently to
Jodl. Exhibit 123 contains various drafts prepared by Wr'ST/\u,
dated 14, 15 and 17 October 1942, initialed by vlarl imont.
tertalnlng to these drafts the stateiricnt of Jodl in his
affidavit is quoted as follows;
"in reference to warlimonths partici
pation in the drafting, formulating, amend
ing and execution of nltler's 'no/nmando-
befehl' of 16 October 1942, and to the
documents b06-PS, 531-PS, 1£63~PS, and
l*c:79-r3, submitted to me, I declare the
following: every time when the heading is
' ifVehrmachtfuehruiigsstab, Q,u. ', it referred
to the quartermaster section. in this
case, and as a rule - I say, as a rule, not
always^- they were matters which were handled
by v/AhbliiOhT directly v/lth -t'ield IViarshal
hETTEL, '•"'Oiuetime 3, I saw one thing ort -. •
another , but generally not. He participated
in such things much more than I did. I have
worked but little with the quartermaster
section. In order to keep a clear head,
1 did not bother with all these thinp:s.
Therefore, j/ArtLILONT has particxpated to
a greater extent, in all thin-.s where it
says quartermaster S'...oti on.
"Cf course, 1 saw many thin ,s, but most
of thorn 1 did not see. Ox coui^se, I have
seen everything pertaxniiig to operational
things with which he dealt, except small
matbers^ of a subordinate nature, vhxlch he
signed iiimself once in a while, such as un
important individual orders about which he
may have called me up before, important
matters were pi^epared by him, and then sub
mitted to me."
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This affidavit, while not particularly enlightening as to
the Conrnoando Order, is most enlightening as to the procedure
followed in such matters, and definitely does not bear out
the statement of ferlimont that he received detailed in
structions from Jodl as to what was to be contained in the
Commando Order which he-was to draft. The exhibit shows,
on page 27,' the initials of i/i/arlimont. This was the final
form of the draft which h© submitted to Jodl. The remain- •
ing drafts in this exhibit were apparently pr^^pared by
Jodl himself. It Is noted in this draft (paragraph 2) that
the words ''no matter whether as soldiers and/or in what
uniform" are contained.
lixhibit 122 shov/s certain changes in the d efendant' s
handwriting v/ere made iiier-ein. (See also xils testimony,
pages 6968-9 of the tr•inscript.) These changes are not
withotit significance. On hage 6993 the defendant claims
"the changes in handwring which I had to prcad to you,
I did not invent myself but they had been ordered to me or
at least ordered to thi.^ effect." bnder the circumstances,
the attempt to shift tU-3 responsibility for them, presum
ably to Jodl, is not convincing.
It is argued by tOie defendant li!»arlimont in his testi
mony that since Hitler drew up the final draft of ^
this order himself, that he had no further connection therer
with, and his responsibility thereto was terminated. The
Tribunal does not agree with this contention. Viihilc it
appears that Hitler arew the final order, he had before
him the ideas •."hich had been -jxpressed b:;- the defendant
in various drafts, and part of those were incorporated in
the final order. It is significant that the Hitler order
departs in many ways from the original radio announcement
and goes much further. 'Jhe- ideas of the defendant are
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conaldei^d by the Tribunal to be a material part of
the final product.
The record in this case shows that the Comi'nando Opdor
was carried out, and British, -iraerican and i^orwegian
soldiers were executed under its provisions.
On 26 November lt^42 tne defendant Warlimont, in a
note for personal report, advised Jodl tha.t in the east
the nrmy 3-eneral btaff considered the destruction of the v/rilfcoa
Commarido Order issued below iirniy and Staffs of other hohr-
macht branches of the same level, important in consideration
of the situation in the east, laarlimont, on his own ini
tiative, states in this note: "On other fronts also there
exists the danger of this order falling into the hands of
the enemy." Pursuant to this note and Jodl's order, a
teletype was transmitted by the Oh/ii/.vFST/^^u, directing
that all copies v/ith the Gorman troops in Africa and
land were to be destroyed, a similar text v/as sent to the
havy, the Arnjy and the uuftv/affe.
On 13 December 1944, the «.rrrE d Porces Commander in
tJorway sent a telegram to the ChW/u^i/FST stating the im
portance of interrogating captured commandos before shoot
ing them, calling attention to the protest of the heioh
✓
Commissar and the Chief of the Security Police bocausL.
I
this had not been done in a case at Egcrsund v/hero comrriando
liquidation had been iinmcdiato. The purpose of interroga
tions is clearly brought out by this docura^nt. Tnis
teletype was answered by the OKw'/w'FST/^u (III), Initialed
by Warlimbnt, to the eflcct that retaining commindos
for interrogation conformed to the Fuehrer Order of 19
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nature of the Commando Order, and that the defendant
had knowledge of and participated in this effort. Other
ovidencG establishes that the defendant advised the Chief
of Prisoner of yi/ar Affairs that commandos were not prisoners
of war but criminals and therefore their deaths should not
be reported to the home country. 'J-'he defense of this in
human act on the part of the defendant as found on trans
cript pages 7014 and 7015 is not sustained by the record.
On 26 i:'"ebruary 1944 the defendant prepared and sent a
telegram to the OcinTmandcr-ln-'-^hief, Southeast, la, with
reference to landings of -English commandos on the Islcinds
of Patmos and Piskopi, which roads as follows:
''On the occasion of the reported landings
bv Ijnglish commandos on Patmos on the 19
February and on Piskopi on the 25 February,
reference is made onct; again to subject
order."
'''«
The defendant claims that ho knev/ this teletype order
would not be carried out from conversations which he had
with Guneral Foertsch, Chief of Staff of the Southeast
Command. The wording of the order is that of- the defendant.
It provides that with reforonce to a specific case, "reference
is made once again to the Commando Order." The teletype
is addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, •Southeast, la. It
amounts to a direct order to him to -apply the Commando
Order. That Foertsch would receive this order wo can
only infer from his position as chief of staff. That he
would ignore it, and his commander-in-chiL;f would ignore
It, wa are asked to believe on the basis of some conversa
tions of the defendant with him. As has boon pointed out
30 frequently in this case, the chief of staff was charged
with the responsibility of bringing such matters to the
attention of his commanding general, and had no command
iV. u... .
authority over suhcrdln-'^te units of a command. The de
fendant could net assume that the ordtr would not be
carried out,
The defend^^nt states th?t this order was signed "by
^rder" and therefore it carried the weight of the Supreme
Command of the German V/ehrraacht. Ti^is Tribunal is not lia-
pressed with the defense that orders were issued by the OICVj
-nd OKH vrith the intention or understanding that they were
not to be oarried out, or meant something contrary tc their
express wording. The history of German arms and the record
in this caee do notlindicate that the German i/Jehrmacht
acted in an advisory capacity to subordinate units and their
commanders; '^rders were issued to be^ obeyed as written.
In late May rr early June 1944 the following toletyoc
w^s prepared and tr^^nsmltted to the Commander-In-Cnief, South-
e*^st Ic, Top Secret;
"Since det:-ils transmitted are sufficient
for present tlcn to the Turkish government
according to information received from the
Foreign ©ffice, the En--lish radio ooerr^tor
Carpenter and Greek sr'ilor Lis- • ris cap-
turedr-t Allmnia. -re no longer needee md
are rele .sed for sped: 1 troirtraent accord
ing to Fuehrer Order."
This was signed "by order" rli.nont. Pursuant to tnis tele
type tie Conii-; nd.er-in-Chief, Soutne-.-st reported these men
were rele sed for special treatment. Ivarlimcnt testified
witn reference to another document of 7 Fovtmber 1943 when
asked I'diat he understood by special treatment;
" at tnat time I said to myself
'special tre.^tment' means that tlcsc sol
diers are not tre-ted ns prisoners of war.
"Jhat further n-arpened to them I didn t
concern myself with."
Klpp, subordinate of VJarlimcnt, in nie -ffldavlt
et-tes the meaning of the term as follows:
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"Regarding the conception special treat-
ment by the SD I state the follov^ing:' We
never gave it any thought in the Vi/FSi a^-
to what v;ays and means were used in qarry?;
ing out this special "treatment. It was, •
however, the general ieeling that ^special
treatment' meant that the persons involveH"
were somehow eliminated by the SB, that is,
were liquidated."
This Ti'^ibunal finds that in May 1944 the defendant
knew that the men whom he ordered released to the SD for
special treat'ment were to be executed.
On 15 Jur.e 1944 the Chief of Staff of the Commander,
Southeast, reported that pursuant to telephone instructions
of Warlimont, the German Military Mission had arranged with
the Bulgarian Army to treat enemy agents, sboteurs, etc.,
in accordance with the Commando Order, On June 1944,
in reply to art inquiry of the Corrmiander-in-Chief, West,
. requesting instructions on the application of the Com
mando ^rder the invasion of the y^est, '^arlimont stated
in a Gonfida.iitial memorandum the position of the 'jifFST as
follows:
'^1. The Commando Order remains basically
f.n effect even after the enemy landing in
che we s t.
"2. Number 5 of the order is to be clari
fied to the effect, that the order is not
valid for those enemy soldiers in uniform,
who are cap tured in open combat in the im
mediate combat area of the beachhead by
our troops committed there, or who surrender.
Our troops comniitted in the iinraediate combat
area means the divisions fighting on the front
line as well as reserved up to and including
corps headquarters.
"3. i^'urthermore, in doubtful cases enemy
personnel who oave fallen into our hands
alive are to be tm-'ned over to the SD, upon
whom it is encumbent to determJ.ne whether
the OoiTimando order is to be applied or not.
"4. Supreme '-'omm.and west is bo to it
that all units committea in its zon^^- are
orally acquainted in a suitable manner with
the order concerning the treatment of members
of commando undertakings of 13 Get 42 alonv
with the above explanation."
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This was signed tf#arlimont and not "by order".
On 25 June 1944 an inter-office communication of
Deputy Chief Vi/PST to the Operations Office (Q,u. ) stated;
"Subject: Treatment of Members of Commando
Detachments
Chief i/VFSt desires that the follow
ing order be given without any formalities,
but clearly and simply:
*1) all sabotage, etc. troops, encountered
outside the actual combat area of Normandy
will be eliminated, in special cases they
will be delivered to the SD,
"2) Concise instructions will be given ac
cordingly to all troops stationed outside
the combat area of i^iormandy*
"3) "i-'he Commander-in-Chief v«Gst, starting
immediately, will make daily reports on the
n^imber of saboteurs liquidated in this way.
This number shall be given daily in the
Vvehrmacht report, in order to have a deter
rent efiect as it was already done in the
same manner against previous coraraanao
operations. This applies in particular to
the operations of the military commander."
This was signed by the defendant. This ruling was trans
mitted in substance by teletype, signed by heitel, ini
tialed by ^ivarlimont, to the CoKmiander-in-Chief West.
On 3 July 1944 he initialed a teletype "by order"
to the effect that the order was not to be distributed
further down than Divisional staffs and comparable staffs,
and that copies below this level were to be recalled and
destroyed.
On 22 June Warlimont initialed a letter to the WH
stating that the Fuehrer Order is to be applied, even
If the enemy employs only one person for a ta^k.
On 22 July the opinion of various offices was ob
tained as to what should be done with regard to military
missions captured with partisan grcups. Exhibit 165
•contains opinlonB
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of various offices as to the action they believed should
be taken. The document, in paragraph three, gives the
opinion and proposal of the Armed Forces Operational
Staif, which reads as follows;
"According to the Orders issued to date, even
for example, the British captiored in the 'riossel-
sprung' operation must be treated as prisoners of
war.
•O'
"fhe Commando Order has nevor yet been applied
to such missions, its extended application to
cover them has not yet been ordered. if the
missions are to be treated otherwise than in
accordance with the orders to date, it must first
be decided v/hether a foreign mission acting
with the partisan groups in the South hast is to
be called a commando operation and therefore
treated as such. Such a decision seems to be
indicated even if it does not correspond com
pletely to the wording of the commando order
or to the previous definition of a coiTimando-
operation (as an espe-cially unaerhand and still
unusual form of warfare which must be combatted
with the appropriate counter measures). The
principle must be adopted from the start that
all members of partisan groups, even in the
^outh hast, are fundamentally guerrillas. In
deed, they are treated as_ prisoners of war,
for reasons of expediency, in order to ob
tain the largest possible number of deserters and
workers. There is no reason fcr this with'regard
to the members of foreign missions who are not
numerous. There is therefore no necessity to
treat them in every case, in t he same v;ay as
the members of partisan groups themselves.
Basically, it would be far more appropriate to
consider -^nglo-^i-merioan as well as '^oviet-
Bussian military missions as commando-operations
and to treat their members accordingly.
"The appended order is therefore proposed."
This part of the document, including the appended
order as proposed, is initialed by ^narlinont. 'J-'he minutes
of the meeting also inclosed in this document show the
handwritten note of the defendant warlimont.
"why still all these discussions after
decisions have been taken according to
paragraj[ii 1?" (Initialed vi/arlimontl
The final draft of the order, signed by iveitel,
shows that the proposal initialea by Vvarlimont to the
effect that military missions should be treated as
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coimiandos, became a part of the final order.
On 6 June 1944 •ambassador iMeubacher sent a teletype
message to the i^'oreign Office stating:
"Wehrmacht Operations Staff, General
Vrfarlimont, gave the order to the Chief
of btaff of Army Group F by telephone to
hand over the captured v;ar correspondents
Talbot, Slapo and -^'owler to the SD, after
they had been interrogated by militai'y
authorities and the Foreign Office, in
accordance with the Fuehrer ur-der of 18
October 1942 on the treatment of prisoners
from British Commando operations."
From this evidence it is apparent that not only did the
defendant ^>^arlimont contribute to the formulation of
this order but that he participated in its enforcement.
3. Prohibited Labor of Prisoners of Vvar
'whilG the record in this case establishes many orders
prepared by the sections of the ii^FST undei- VVarlimont's
supervision pertaining to the use of prisoners of war, v;e
are unable to find beyond a reasonable doubt any criminal
connection of the defendant as to the illegal use of
prisoners of war.
4. Murder and Ill-treatment of hnemy Belligerents and
IT is oners of i^^ar
In the program adopted by the leaders of the Third
Ueich wherein thoy undertook.to Inspire the Gorman popu
lation to murder -^llled fliers by lyncVi law or "mob jus
tice", they were indeed sinking deeper Into the morass of
depravity, ^'or in this they undertook to incite the
Geritan people to set aside the safeguards of law built
up through centuries and to resort to mob violence. That
such a plan was fostered and encouraged by the Ihird
heich i3 established oy the record. It has been commented
upon in the Judgment of the IiViT and was passed upon by
Tribunal III in the Justice case.
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This plan constituting a crime against humanity, the
question arises as to the connection of the defendant
i/Varlimont with this criminal undertaking. As shown by
the record, this plan as to so-called .rtllied terror fliers
was divided into two parts, '- '^he first of these had to do
with fliers who had been captured and were in the air
force prison at Oberursol. Those who ' it was decided
had taken part in alleged'illegal activities were to be
txxrned over to the SD for liquidation, contrary to the
provisions of the Geneva Convention. In this regard the
prosecution concedes that the proof does not -establish
that any orders pertaining to this were ever issued or
carried out. '-^he animus of the defendant in this matter,
however, la established by documents which show his con
sent and approval of this proposal.
•Lhe second part of this illegal program provided that,
through the Party and the agencies of propaganda under
Goebbels, the German people were called upon to execute
ii-llied fliers v;ho fell into their hands and wore as
sured that they would not be called to account for their
actions in such cases. I'his was done by orders issued to
the police, by information disseminated by the Party, by
suspQ^®!®^ prosecutions against the populace, and also
by preventing interference of the army in such cases,
ihe record shows the defendant niiarlimont was well in
formed on the entire matter. P-e attended numerous con
ferences and personally discussed the matter with halten-
brunner, one of the active participants in the v/hol© pro^
cedure, who informed him that lynch law was to be the
rule. There was much correspondence, in which he took a
part, with the i '^oreign Ofiice and with Goering, who was
reluctant to consent to participation in this scheme for fear
of reprisals. The authors of the plan desired on the one
hand to intimidate the enemy and at the same tim^ to cloak
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its operations in such a manner that it would not re
sult in reprisals. The problem was to outline for pub
lication certain alleged acts of allied fliers which were
contrarjr tp International law and therefore deprived them
of the status of prisoners of war. This was not to
do.
At the conference of 6 June, 1944, attendpci by the
defendant, it is shown thi^.t he mentioned that:
"apart from Lynch law, a procedure must
be wori<sd out for segregating those enemy
aviators, who are suspected of criminal
action of this kind, until they are re
ceived into the deception Camp for aviators
at "Jberursel; if the suspicion was confirmed,
they would be handed over to the SjJ for
special treatment.
"For this purpose the VuFST would cooperate
with the Supreme Command of the Air -force
to get out the necessary regulations for
the use of the head of the camp at Cberursel.
"Obergruppenfuchrer Aaltcnbrunner expressed
his complete^agreemcnt with this view and
that the SD take charge of those aviators
segregated."
On 14 June a" draft was prepared by the ic^uartermaster
Section of the OiOV, and initialed by Warlimont, which
contained a statement;
"in connection with the press notices at
home and abroad about the treatment of
terror fliers who fall into the hands of
the population, an unequivocal determina
tion of the concept of those facts which
characterize a oil minal action in this
sense is called for."
Regarding this statement, \i»arlimont made the comment on
the draft, "This Is not quite the point"; and he further
amended the draft by stating that the definition of
criminal acts is neoess-ary "only for publication". The
matter was taken up with the foreign Office by Aeitel
in a letter initialed by warlimont, requesting approval
of the Foreign Office to the proposed action. un the
same date a similar letter was sent to Colonel von
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Brauchitscii, Goeriingls Adjutant, This draft was corrected
by f^arlimont and contains his initials. This letter stated
as follov;s;
III. On the basis of preliminary dis-
pussions 'ahd piipsuant' to ah agreement
with""the Heich Minister for i'^orcign
Affairs and the Chief of the Security
Police and SD the following are to be
regarded as acts of terror when a case
of lynch law is made public and/or to
justify the handing over of prisoners of
war among enemy fliers from the rceeiving
(Piv) camp for fliers at Oberursel to the
SD for special treatment."
On 23 June 1944, a letter prepared by the Vi/PST/Q.
(Verw.I), addressed to the Supreme Commander of the Air
•force, for the attention of Colonel von Brauchitsch, under
took to speed Ooering's decision with regard to this
matter. On 20 June, Ambassador Hitter answered Aeitel's
letter of 15 June 1944, enclosing a draft by the Foreign
Office which states as follows:
"In spite of the obvious objections, founded on-
international law and foreign politics, the Foreign
Office is basically in agreement with the proposed
measures.
"In the examination of the individual cases a dis
tinction must be made between the cases of lynch
ing and the cases of special treating (Sonderbe-
handlung) by the Security Service (SD).
"I. In the cases of lynch law the sharp defini-
f tion of the criminal acts, as given in numbers 1
to 4 of the letter of 15 June, is not very important,
•f'irst of all no German official a.gency is directly
responsible; death has already occurred before a
® German agency is concerned with the case. Further
more the accompanying circumstances v\?ill, as a rule,
be such that it will not be difficult to present
the case in a most suitable mrmer v/hen it is pub
lished. In the cases of lynch law it will there
fore be mainly a question of correctly dealing
with the individual case when it is published. "
Concerning the last statements of this above-quoted draft,
a notation of Warlimont's appears on the margin as follows:
"That la the whole point of our letter" (Initialed "warlimont)
- 302 .
In paragraph II concerning airmen captured by the
armed forces, xtitter shows that in his opinion these men
acquired the legal status of prisoners of war. After this
statement Warliraont placed a question mark and noted:
"Precisely, this v/ill be prevented by the proposed segre~
gation". Hitter then v/ent onto state:
"These rules are so precise that any
attempt to disguise an individual case
of violation by a clever wording of
publication would be hopeless."
I'o this statement ii^arlimont wrote on the margin:
"Ko, - through the segregation and immediately
following special treatment."
tioering finally agreed in general to the procedure recom
mended and Vv'arlimont wrote "'we finally have to act. vfliat
else is required for that?"
•Uuring all these discussions the defendant is shown
to have had an active part and to have been concerned
not only with the legality of the question, but with the
possibility of handling the entire matter by publication
in such a way as to avoid reprisals.
In a- file note dated 2 October 1944 it is stated:
"The Herr -lieichsme.rshall agrees that the
order OK^rf/vvPSt Qu (Administration 1) No.
05119/44 secret of 9 July 1944 concern
ing the' conduct of soldiers, in case of
'mob justice' being attempted by the popu
lation on downed terror fliers, is Issued
within the Luftv/al'fe as an order of the
Supreme Oommand of the Armed lorces, but
not as an order ol the Supreme Oommand
of the Luftwaffe."
It is shown that the Air ^'hrce Administrative Command
VI (Luftgaukommando VI) Tactical L^oup (^uehrungsabteilung)
la Issued on 11 December 1944 the following order, per
tinent parts of which are quoted:
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"The Chief Ohiiy has issued the following
order (OKW/vJFST/Q,u (Verw.l) No. 01 119/44 seer,
dated 9 July 1944) concerning the behavior of
the soldiers in cases of self-help action taken
by the civilian population against terror fliers
shot down:
"Recently, it has happened that soldiers have
actively protected rtnglo-iimerican terror fliers
from the civilian population, thus causing justi
fied resentment. "You will take immediate steps
in order to ensure by oral instruction of all subor
dinate units and command authorities that the sol
diers do not counteract the civilian populat ion in
such cases by claiming the handing over* to them
of the enemy fliers as prisoners of war and by
protecting, and thus ostensibly siding with, the
enemy terror fliers.
"No fellow German can understand such attitude
from the part of our armed forces. The inhabitants
of the occupied territories, too, must not be re
strained from either resorting to self-help out of
their justified indignation against the- Anglo-
iimerlcan terror fliers, or from giving other utter
ances to their justified-resentment against the
prisoners belonging to the enemy powers. In ad
dition, I refer to thv. article by Reich Minister
Dr. GOEBBSLS published in the *Voelklscher Beo-
bachtor♦, Berlin edition dated 27 May 1944, No.
148, and entitled:
terror. *"
hi comment on the enemy air
The significant part of this order is that it was
based on an order of the OKw i/VFST/q. (Verw.l), dated 9
July* "the time when this matter was being discussed
as outlined above. It is contended that from the date of
this order it ' could not have been based upon any
order actually Issued by the WFST but must have been based
upon a personal order of Hitler as Commander-in-Chief of
the Replacement iixray. iiiiith this contention, this Tribunal
cannot agree. Regardless of the date that this order
was finally issued by the Luftgau Command, the date of
the order referred to derives from the (Quartermaster Sec
tion under imarlimont, and the date was at the time when he
was concerned with this entire matter.
We therefore find the defendant Warlimont connected
with the illegal plan of the leaders of the I'hlrd Reich
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fostering the lynching of allied fliers and that he con
tributed a significant part to this criminal program. The
record shows many instances whore the German population,
pursuant to this plan, murdered Allied fliers who fell
into their hands;
In commenting upon the defendant, Jodl stated:
"Developed better and better from year
to year. In addition to his ever eminent
mental qualities, his far sightedness and
his comprehensive knowledge and experiences,
his National Socialist attitude also has be
come strongly marked, as my deputy and chief
of the whole staff of Irreplaceable value to
me. jExcellont, By the fuehrer's order com
pelled to. stay in present position."
5. Deportation and hnslavement of the Civilian Population
The record in this case, from various communications,
reports and conferences, establishes that the defendant
Vi/arlimont was well av/arc of the criminal program of the
I'hird Keich as to the deportation and use of civilians
from the occupied territories for slave labor in Germany,
As to his connection therewith, Bxhibit 536 shows that
i/'mrlimont attended a conference in the Chancellery of
the Third Reich, called for the purpose of taking in
tensive measures for the recruitment of foreign laborers.
The minutes of this conference, in pertinent part, read
as follows:
"The Deputy of the head of the QiCW, General JVarli-
mont, referred to a rt^cently issued Puehrer Order,
according to which all German forcos had to place
themselves in the service of the work of acquiring
manpower, uVherever the .*ohrmacht was and was not
employed exclusively in pressing military duties
(as, for example, in the construction of the
coastal defenses), it would be available, but it
could not actually be assigned for the purposes
of the GBA. General Warlimont made the following
practical suggestions:
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"a) The troops employed in fighting parti
sans are to take over in addition the
task of acquiring manpower in the parti
san areas. Everyone, who cannot fully
prqve the purpose of his stay in these
areas, is to be seized forcibly.
Mb) Vijhen l^ree cities ^ due to the difficulty
of providing food, arc vi^holly or partly
evapuated the population suitable for
labor commitment is to be put to work
with the assistance of the \/ehrmacht.
"o) The seizing of labor recruits among the
refugees from the areas near the front
should be handled especially intensively
with the assistance of the Wehrmacht."
The Tribunal is of 'the opinion that these suggestions
of the defendant warlimont made at these conferences are
themselves sufficient to connect him criminally with the
illegal program of the Reich for recruiting slave labor.
Eurther, we find from the evidence as shown in Exhibit
1631 of 1 August 19 44 and Exhibit 1632 of 10 iiugust 1944,
shortly after the conference of 12 June 1944, that the
methods which he suggested v^ere put into operation. -
The Tribunal finds the defendant guilty of criminal
participation in and connection with the deportation and
enslavement of civilians.
5, Plunder of Public and Private Property and V/anton
Destruction
The record in this case shows that the defendant
'warllraont had knowledge of this matter, but we are unable
to find from the evidence In this case beyond a reasonable
doubt that he was connected therewith.
7, Murder, Ill-treatment and Persecution of Civilian
Population
a. Criminal Connection with the Barbarossa ^vdov
The evidence in this case, including but not limited
to exhibits 590 and 593, establishes the criminal parti
cipation of the defendant in the formulation of the
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Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order and vie so find. V/e have
discussed this order in other parts of this Judgment,
and in particular as to the defendant i-iehmann, and shall
not go into it further here.
b. Illegal Kxecutions of the Civilian Population
The defendant is' also charged with participation in
the formulation of the so-called nostage Order. This
order is in fact not a hostage order in any meaning of
the term but, regardless of the designation that may be
given to it, it is a criminal and illegal order and we
so find. It is claimed by the defendant that page two
of this order was- takon out and.rewritten, without hls^khow-
ledgc.-while, page one and three remained unchanged. It is
conceded by the defendant, however, that the type is
the same on the three pages and that the second page
might have been written in the Regional iJefsnse division
of the OKVY. Careful examination of this document and
the testimony of the defendant in regard thereto brings
out further significant facts. Page two begins with
paragraph two. It ends v;ith the second paragraph under
the heading "c". It is obvious that page three refers
to the last paragraph on the preceding page. Prom the
statement "clever ijropaganda of this kind, etc." it is
clear that the first paragraph on page three follows
the last paragraph on page two. It is further evident
that in the original unchanged document there must have
been a paragraph three with sub-headings a, b and c. It
is very unlikely that either hitler or Keitel, in changing
a draft of the defendant's with which they were not
satisfied, would have followed the paragraphing of the
defendant in so doing. Apparently one of these paragraphs
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had to dg witlg the number of people who were to be
shQt in atonement for each German sQldier. In respect
to that nunfe er, the defendant no longer remembers whothvi?
or not the original draft, prepared by the defendant, con
tained the figures 5 to 10 as the ratio established, and
he states to the best of his recollection, no figures
wore contained in the original draft. It is apparent,
however, from the evidence that some ratio was to be
established. Keitel's testimony before the IMT regarding
this matter merely shows that the ratio submitted by him
to Hitfer was changed from 10 and 5 to 100 and 50 by
HStler.
Paragraph 3 (a) provides:
"It should be inferred, in every
case of resistance to the German Oc
cupying forces, no matter what the in
dividual circumstances, that it is of
Communist origin."
This provision in Itself was illegal, defendant*s recol
lection on the whole matter appears to be somewhat vague
but he recalls that in the headquarters it was general
talk that Hitler added the zeroes to the 5 and 10 figures.
This we can readily believe. The first and third pages
of this order, which the defendant admits having drawn,
do not suppprt the contention that the second page
claimed to have been submitted by him made his draft
legal. iiVe are convinced that the original draft as
submitted to Keitel Viras illegal regardless oi the
figures inserted or v/hether the ratio was left in blank
to be filled in by his superiors.
Warllmont's defense that he Immediately took steps
to sefe that it would not be carried out throughout the
wide domain of the Wehrmaoht to which it was distributed
is not convincing. His testimony that his was a negligible
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position is not consistent with such a far-reaching
capacity to nullify an order of the OICvV.
c. Discrimination, Persecution and Execution of Jev/s
by the k^ehrmacht, and Cooporation v;ith the
Einsatzgruppen and SD
From the record in this case showing the defendant's
official position, his associates, both superior and in
ferior, from his many activities to which he has testified,
and from the documents before us, this Tribunal is
thoroughly convinced that tho defendant knev/ of the ox-
termination program which was being carried out by his
superiors and associates. Just when ho acquired this
knowledge it would be imposslblo to determine, and wc are
unable to find beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence
before us that he knowingly was connected with or parti
cipated in its execution.
d. Cooperation with the Einsatzgruppen of thi
Rosenberg ^taff
From his position as Jodl's deputy as liaison agent
with the Rosenberg organization, wo also are convinced
of his knov/lfcdge of the illegal activities carried out
by this organization. But we are, from the evidence
before us, unable to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
he was connected with its Illegal activities.
©. Reprisals against Families of P'rench Officers
The record in this case establishes the discreditable
and inhumane attitude of the defendant toward innocent
members of families of French officers, but we are unable
to find from the evidence where he participated in any
international criminal act in this matter.
- 309 -
f. The and Fog D©cree
The question arises as to the connection which the
defendant 'Jarlimont had with this decree, but we are-
unable to find from the evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt any criminal connection therewith.
g.'Other Illegal Orders
On 1 July 1944 v^arlimont sent the following teletype
to the Chief of the VtiR:
"Subject; Combatting of enemy terrorists
in the occupied territories
"On account of events in Copcniiagen,
the Fuehrer has decreed that court martial
proceedings against civilians in the occupied
territories must be discontinued v/ith im
mediate cffuct. VifR is requested to submit
suggestions for the draft of an order con
cerning bhe treatment of eneny tv^rrorlsts
and saboteurs among the civilian population
in the occupied territories by 2 July,
20:00 hours.
"i olicies 5
"Terror can be countered only ,by terror,
but court martial sentences only cijeate
martyrs and national heroes.
"If uorman units or individual soldiers
are attacked in any manner, the commander
of the unit and/or the individual soldier
are bound to take counter-measures independ
ently and, in particular, to oxterminate
terrorists. Terrorists or saboteurs who are
arrested later, must bo turned over to the
SD."
As a final paragraph, which is hardly adapted to relegate
tho Commando Order to the oblivion which he claims to
have so earnestly sought, the defendant states:
"The Fuehrer Decree on the treatment of
enemy ii-oimiiandos, dated 18 October 19 42
(The Fuehrer No. 003830/42 top secret(mil. )/OKw/lyPST) will remain in force
as it does not apply to the civil nopu-
lation."
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The record in the'case shows that the defendant,
during the course of the war, was located at Hitler's
headquarters and in constant contact with Kcitel and
Jodl, and attended almost daily conferences with Hitler.
havG found the defendant guilty of participating
in many criminal orders which permeated the conduct of
the war. He may not have furnished the basic ideas, but
he contributed his part and was one of the most important
figures of the group v^hich iormod them into the final
product which, when distributed through the officiant
agencies of the wohrmacht and Police, brought suffering
and death to countless honorable soldiers and unfortunate
civilians.
The defendant Warlimont is guilty under Counts Two
and Three of the Indictment.
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OTTO V70EHLER
Otto Vifoohlor \w^.3 born on 12 July 1894. Ho -parti-
cipatod in tho first world war c.s troop loader and was
wounded throe tiioos. Pollov/in~ tho war ho boce^^.o an
officer in tho Roichswohr, or Ono Hundred Thousand Ron
^4.rmy, and served in various capacities until 1 —pril
1933 whon ho was transferred to the staff of tho .^rey
Group 5 in Vienna under General List. This bocano tho
14th -^rny and he c'ontinued to servo with this aroiy
as la throur;hout tho Polish Caiopai^n. .".fter this ho was
transferred and bocano chiof of tho G-onoral Staff of tho
17th Corps. Ho participated as such in the .Tostorn
CanpalGn*
"In 'tho fall of 1940 ho was transferred and bocano
Chiof of Staff of tho 11th ..rny which was nowly activated.
On 1 lia '^ 1942 he v/as transferred and app:)intod Chief of
Staff of tho hrny Group Contor whore ho ronainod for ton
nonths. In Harch of 1943 ho was ^Ivon conn.and of tho
First 7jrny Corps as acting connandinG general and later,
m 1 Juno 1943, v/as dosirnatod as the Gon-anding General
of this Corps. On 1 July 1943 ho took over connond of
tho 2Gth Corps v/hich ho hold until approxinatoly 14
hugust 1943, -^t approoiinatoly this tine ho was trans
ferred to .-rny Group S 'Uth and bocano Coniaander- of tho
..,rboitonko:..u3f which on 15 .-ugust, whon ho took over,
was known at tinos as tho .-nay Gruppo l/oehlor and
ultinatcly bocano tho 3th ...niy. Ho was Connandor-in-
Ohlof of tho 8th .-rny until Doconb.jr 1944. On 22 Doconbor
ho v/as designated as Gorxiandor-in-Chiof of ...ru^ Gr aup
South which ho hold until 6 ..prll 1945,
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Ho did not bolonG to the No.zi Pr.rty ?.r o.Tr~ of its
fornntions•
J.sido fron tho chr.r^p of Crinos i^gainst Poaco, horoto-
foro disposed of in this opinion, wo think that charges
nndor Connts Two and Throe of tho Indictment nay ho dis-
posod-of under the followln.p ho-adinp:s ? (1) Tho Conuiasai-'
Ordor; (2) Tho Gomi:iando Ord.or; (3) Murder and Ill-Troatmont
of Prisoners of hk.r; (4) Prohihitod Labor of Prisoners of
•7ar; (5) The Barbarossa Jurisdicti :)n Ord^rj (6) I-Iostapos
and Koprisals; (7) Plunder and V/anton Destruction; (0)
Deportation and Enslo.voment of Civilians; (9) Murder, 111-
l^roatnont, and Persecution of Civilio.ns.
1, Tho Coriimissar Order.
Tho proof in this caso shows tho dLefondant, a.s Chief
of Staff of tho 11th .-^rny, kncv/ of tho rocoipt of this
order. It does not, however, establish any participation
in its transnittal to subordinate units. It also shows
that he know of the onf orcei.iont of this order in the
11th drny but tho rosponsibility for carrpln^ out this
order within tho 11th --rmp nust rest with the Goimiandor-
in-Chiof o.nd not with tho Chief of Staff. Criminal acts
or no^lcct of a cor.nandor-in-chiof aro not in thonsolvos
t
to bo so chr.r£;od against a chief of staff. Ho has no
cor.oand authority over subofclinato units nor is ho a boaror
of oxocutivo power. Tho chief of staff nust bo porsenally
comiGctod by ovidonco with such criminal offenses of his
cor.m.ander-in-chiof before ho can bo held crininally
rosoonsiblo«
2. Tho Connando Order.
Tho proof in this caso doos not establish that it
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V/C.S distributod by tho dofondant --.r that it wr.s oxocutod
7/ith li5.s knov/lodao and consent.
3. ;..hirdor and Ill-Tror-tii-ont of x'ris oners of "jor.
.is Chief of Staff of the 11th .'.rny, ho is chari^cd V:ith
responsibility for an order issnod by the 0 'in for 'iiOS''.
V/hilc part of this order is considorod. cri"'^inal by the
Tribunal, the fact that this order was issued by a sub
ordinate of the dofondant in the staff oryr.nization over
v/hon ho had no cor.uoand authority loads the- Tribunal to
conclude that the dofondant was not connected therewith.
The 0 du was a subordinate of the chief of staff but ho
was also a subordinate of the con::,iander-ln-chiof and to hold
the chief of staff responsible for this order, wo r.mst
necessarily nake the assvLotl^n that it was n:^t issued
b-^- the conioandor-in-chiof without his intervention, -which
«/ "
the docui-.iont in itself doos not establish. Tlio fact that
this order vaas actually carried out by subordinate units
as shown by evidence in the record is the responsibility,
as stated above, of the connandor-in-chiof and n^t of the
chief of staff,
Coixjanding General of the I ."-rny Corps, the record
osto.blishos that ho reported to the hOK 18 the illegal
shooting of two captured Rod .Irny soldiers. The dofondant
oade those reports as Coin.ending Gonoral and apparently
did nothing about then but his acquiosconco and approvo-1
are not considered established, by the evidence.
4, frohibited Labor of Prisoners ^f V/ar.
Docuioonts in ovidonco sh->v/ that vdiilo Con::ond.or-in—
Chief of the 0th hri;ry, units subordinp.to to Woohlor used
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prisoners of v/rr in the c.xfDat r.roa c.nd tli-.t sucli prisoners
v/oro allocatoc'. to roj^-ireonts for tho construction of field
positions. It is the opinion of this Tribimol as horotoforo
stated, that -the use of prisoners of vmr hp ropinonts and
forward units of co::i...and in a conhat area constituted a
use in a position of danpor. V/o are further of the opinion
froL} the Gvidcnco that the defendant Icnov/ and acqr.loscod
therein. The fact that siuilar use vi^as nado of Gorean
prisoners by the onony is enriy a factor in idtiation and
not in dofonsG.
5. The Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order.
It is shown that this order was received by the 11th
A4.rny but no crininal connection with its distrioution ho.s
boon established by the ovldbnco'as to this defendant,
Crin5.nal acts thereof are to bo cha r^ed apainst the
oo;:a'':0.ndor-in-chiof, not the chlof of staff as horotoforo
stated, liowovor, on 5 Soptoi3ber 1941, oji order v;as issu.od
by the 11th -*rMy, siyned for the ^,0K by 'Jiohlor, as Chief
of Staff, Pron the nature of this order, it v/oulc. appear
that it v/as not of that ba.sic nature v/hich noccssarily
woixld bo subnlttod to a coionandor-in^chiof• It is such
an order as a chief of staff v/ould nernally issue of nis
ovm volition. V/hothor or not that bo' so, the wordinr: of
tills order v/ould certo.inly bo a riattor that would cone,
within the jurisdiction of a chlof of staff ")f an ar:.]y^
This order provides in po.rapraph 5 as follows;
"Guardiny the front lln-s alono is
not sufficiont. Corps as v/oll as the
Copor.ndjr of the -'.rny Boar -.roa has to
send patr )ls cinstantly'to tho aain roar
lines of co.--..iunication for *raids», which
arrest all suspicious civili''.ns and choch
¥/hother they rosido in the area. Civilians'
who are sufficiently suspected of ospionapo,
- 315 -
r >if
. »i bA.Wiili?.
•Jm
saboto.^o, Dr of or-rtlscin r.ctivitios,
arc to bo sli-t by the GPP aftor intor-
royation» Strangers in tliG area v/ho o.ro
unable to establish the ourposo of their
stay credibly are,.if possible, to bo
turned over to the SD dotachnonts, other
wise to prisoner cai;:ps to bo sent jn to
tho SD detaclnients. Youn^ boys and c^rls,
which are proforcntially enployed by the
onOi.iy, arc not to bo oxcoptod,''
Under this paragraph it is providod that civilians
who aro "sufficiently suspected" of certain offenses o.ro
to bo shot, including bo '^-s o.nd girls. Tho dofonda.nt's
explanation that this order does hot iioan vdaat it says is
not convincing, ^-^t its host it coaild only ho construed as
a.i-.ibigh0us and if it i.ieant soroothlng •:ithor tha.n v/hat it
states, it was certainly the province of the chief of staff
to sec tha.t tha.t error was corrected, Tho Tribimal" is of
tho ooinion that it laeant precisely v/hat it stated and
that the dofondajit was crininally connected thorowith and
is rbsponsiblo thorofor,
V/g are not inpressod with the contention that suspects
wore interrogated before being shot. The record in this
case shov/s that the x^'arpose of such interrogations was
•orinarily to obtain infornatlon of valuo t tho Gornan
ilrny and n'ot in tho interest of tho person interrogated
under such orders.
Tho Kodyria incidont has boon suggested as establishing
original responsibility upon the dofondant, Tlio record
shows th'.t tho report on this matter came to .7oohlor*a
laiowlodgo and was initialed by hln and ho testified that
ho ca.llod tho natter to tho attention of his conno.ndor-
in-ohiof. If ho did so, this was all that could bo
oxpoctod of hir.i* Tho rosponsihility in tnis ca.so rests
with tHo couaandor-in-chiof and was n't a rosponsibllity
resting uxoon tho chief of staff.
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5. Hostacos r.nd Reprisals •
;^s roG^rds this I'lattor the cliar^os a^-aiiist tho
defendant arc br.sod upon transacti.nis which tool: plo.co
within the rroa of tho 11th ^.rirj v/hilc ho was chief cf
staff.
ITo iDorsonal action v/hich ho toolc ")r ncaloctod to
taho within tho scope of his authority is .shov/n by tho
Gvidcnco and for tho roasons abovo sto.tod, tho opinion
of tho Tribunal is that tho proof fails to establish
his criuinal connection.
7. Plunder.
Tho Tribunal is of tho opinion that tho ovidonco in
this co-so fails to ostablish under this noadini-- any
connection of tho dofondant with criinal rosponsibillty
for plunder not justified by military nocossity.
B". Dooortatlon and Enslavonont of Civilians.
Tho evidence in this case shows that as Chief of
Staff of tho 11th -^rr.:y, orders portaininp to the use of
civilians woro issued for tho 11th -•^roy which v/oro sipnod
by V/oohlor. Those orders arc not basic orders and would
normally bo issued by a chief of staff v;ith-)ut ovon con-
suiting tho co:x^andor-in-chiof and cortainly without such
orders being drawn by tho corji.iandor-ln-chiof. Thoso
orders show tho illogal use of civilians with which the
dofondant is criminally connoctod.
Further, tho ovidonco in this caso ostablislios the
X^ractico if coi;ix3\ilsory illegal uso if civilians under
vroQhlor as Cor-Uiandor-ln-Chiof of tho 8th ^^rr:y by units
subordinate to hln. Tho ovidonco further shov;a that on
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25 Juno 1944, an order v/as issuod for tho hoadquortors of
tho -Irny Group Vfochlor "by order" and sionod by his
auo-rtornastor. This order provided for the conpulsDry
rocruitnont of civiliojis and. others to the ileich for
slave labor in tho nines.
9, Ilurder, Ill-troatnent, and Porsocution of tho Civilian
population.
Tho ovidonco in this case establishes the olininataon
of so-called undesirables, nostly Jews, within the area, of
the 11th ^'.rny while i/oehlor was Chief of Staff. This
nurdor progran was carried out und.or the direction of
Ohlondorf who appeared as a witness for tho dofonso in this
case. The approxiuato nuinbor of nxirdors coiniittod within
this area v/as in tho noi^hborhoed of 90,000, incl^•ldinG
non, vjonon, and children. Tho ovid-jnco establishes that
this nurdcr program was hnown in part at least to staff
officers under hoohlor. Tho d.ofondant denies hnowlodge
of this program.
The ovidonco establishes that ho hold various con-
foroncos with Ohlondorf and Ohlondorf tostifiod that tho
nattor was not specifically discussed bocf'.uao ho assuraod the
defendant was av/aro of tho program. This progrs-m was
co.rriod out over an oxtonsivo period of timo and in many
• places within tho occupational aroa of the 11th ^^rny. It
v/as oxocutod by Einsatzgruppon and Sondorhor.ieandos of the
SIPO and SB, attached to that army, sholtorod, fod, and
placed by that army, Gortalnly the slaughter of 90,000
povoplo by thoso police units undor thoso circuitstancos
could not have oscapod tho Icnov/lodgo of tno caiof ef staff
of that army unloss ho v/as grossly inconpotont. The
dofondant did not Indicato incampotonco whllo or^ tho atond
• I. •
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and tliG cor.ji.:Gnts of his various cor.irjandors as shov/ii by his
sorvicG record rsfuto any such ayoraisal. But wo nood
indulGO in no £iOnoral prosuinptions. Tho rocord ostablislios
knov/lodyo by the dofondant of tho oxtornination activitios
of thoso Einsatzgruppo -units.
Ohlondorf, whom tho defendant called as his ov;n v/itnoss,
tGStifiod that staff officers of tho 11th -arry, over ohor.i
tho dofondant oxorcisod supervision, know of his activitios.
Ho also tostifiod that ho r®coivod cooporation frx,; vai'ious
units of tho ariay, such as tho furnishing of trucks to take
his victins to tho placos of oxccutl >n, and that at tii.ics
tho arny ca.llGd on hi- for assistance in thoso natters.
Surely tho knov/lodro of thoso staff officers v;as no.t kept
fron tho chief of staff. Further, the docvii-.iontary ovidonco
in this case establishes the dofond.^^-nt *s lcnov;lodyo, .aiong
thoso wo cites
Exhibit 1601 - initialed by V/oehlor
E-diibit 871 - boarin^p his signature
Exhibit 1606 - initialed by V/oohlor
Exhibit 781 - portainlng t^ tho oxocution of sono 1181
pocplo in retaliation for activitios in
Jowpatoria
Exhibit 780 - which refers to tho sa-no instance and states
that 1300 v;ore oxocutod
Exhibit 885 - a report of tho Ortakor.iiiandantur, 14
Hovorfoor 1941, to tho -*rny Gr-nip Roar droa
of tho 11th j.,ri.iy, which states that 10,000
Jov73 renalning v/oro being oxocutod by the St)
Exhibit 872 - Report of Ortskor';;-.}-'^ndrntur at a.olit-opol,
13 Octobor 1941, wherein It is shown that
2,000 Jov/s wore oxocutod by^ the SB; an
instanco v/hich occurred wat.iin 15 to 20
nilos of tho headquarters of tho 11th :.riry
Exhibit 831 - d c-bnimnication fron tho Ort3.:o;„u.anc.antur
of ".najow of 3 Soptonbor 1941 v;hlch roeorts
tho shooting '^f 300 Jov/s and Jowossos on
18 ..ugust 1941, to tho Oonxjander of tho
Roar ^*roa of the llth ..^rviy
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Scliibit 1607 " a report to tiao 11th -j?ny hj Olilondorf
init ir. loci by V/oohlGr '
Exhibit 16CC' - a report by OUlendorf, initialGd by '/Voehler
shov/intp the ir.:prisonioont of 227 Jev/ish '
suspects and showing the exccutioii of Jews
as hostages and the shooting of political
fxmctionaries of the Gon:ounlst Part-.- by the
Einsatzyruppe unit
Exhibit 1595 - a report of i ..uyust 1941 showing that 97
Jews wore executed in jCodyna by units of the
Einsatzgruppon and 24 soldiers subordinate"
to S^lnuth", which instance i7.;ohlor states v'li
ho reported to his coi']:eandGr-in-»chiof
Exhibit 1594 - a report of 4 ..ugust 1944 by Ohlondorf to
the effect that 68 Jcv/s had boon shot for
Co:3:.;unist activities and shov/ing the
establisliieont .^.f a ghetto in ICiscliinow and
further stating that on 51 July, Jewish
hostages were shot.
The dofondant disavows hnowlodgo of events occuring
in the Roar ..roa of the 11th -nrry on the basis that the
OborqaiarliGrieeistor or Q2 did not report to hivo such
matters in connection v/ith the Rear l^rny .,roa. Field
Manual 90 for 1 Juno 1933, Edition 1940, states ''The
Oberquarhcrioolstor is subordinate to the Chief of the General
Staff of the i^rny'h ..^.s Chief of the Gonoral Staff of the
11th hrr.iy, the dofcndqnt was chief of staff for the whole
arny area including the roar amy area. It was his duty
as Chief of Staff of the 11th hrny t) consult vj-ith sub
ordinates on his staff as to loattors occuring therein a,nd
to advise his corjr.isaiding general concerning such natters»
\io cannot believe that in neglect of that duty the defen
dant's hnov/lodgo of natters concerning the 11th ^-^my stooped
at the bo-ondary of the Rear i.roa.
On this evidence the Tribunal can only find that the
defendant Vioehler had loiowledgo of the oxtornlnation
activities of the Einsatzgruppon vpaon ho was Chief of staff
of the 11th /.rny.
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IlG wr.s not,, hov;ovor, .tlio coi-.i^'tLndinG officor, and his
crininal rcsponslhilitj nuct ho dotorninod dron personal
o.cts In v/hich ho participatod or v/ith which ho is shovai
to ha.vo boon connoctod. This rosolvos itself Into tho
quostion as to whothor as chief of staff ho assirnod
Elnsatz^ruppon to,various localitloa v/horoin thoy operated
and carried on thoir lllo^jal activitlos. That ho did so
is shown by both, tho tostiioony of Ohlondorf and by docuioonts
in ovidonco, E:dilbit 1605 shows that tho dofendant on 5
' ' '4
July 1941 issued an order,-Glsnod by lilUi
assii^^ninG Sondorhon-iando to Stanca. This order states
that tho Sondorhormando porforns its duties at tho order
of tho chief of the Security Police and on its own
responsibility.
On 14 July a slioilar order was Issued, assigning
Einsatz^u-uppo Iht to LIV -.rny Corps "in order to carry out'
its assiynnont in Xischinov;", This order states i
"Einsatz^ruppo D of tho Security Police;
except for tho Sondorlcoi'.raando in action,
will continue to bo subordinated in Piatra
Hoar.it tc ..OK 11".
It states.further
"in accordance with inforrj'\tion rocoivod
fron ..'orr.iy G-roup South, it is n^t intended
to onploy Sinsatz^ruppo H in the -oriiy .n'-oa,"
On 22 July ho si^paod an ordox' statin;^ that tho Bin-
sG.tZi;;ruppo B "except Sondorhoni-ando li;^ and lOh is to ,
bo i:iovod frora Piatra Nos.ut to Jasi" and providing that
"Sondorkor.iriando IIB will bo oriployod in tho aroa of tho
2nd Houi-ianian .\,rr.iy v/ith the task to carry out asaiynnonts
of a political nature".
On 7 -Aiyust ho slynod a sinilar order to the
Einsatzoruppe D, statins "Tho Blnsatzkon.aandos which are
cnpleyod ho.vo to look after security in tho conbat area
- 321 -
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bohind tho conbat tro.jps fror.. tho countop intolli^coiicc
point of viow in addition to tho toslcs ^ivon thoio so far''.
This S.X-.10 o.xhibit shows that on 20 Soptonbor tho
dofondant initialed a corxunication o.ddrossod to tho 11th
.'.rnp which was transnittod -undor date of 29 SoptGrhDor to
tho Counter Intolli^oncG Officer to take action, concerning
neasures taken by tho Elnsats(truppon of tho 22nd Infantry-
Division and also shows on 6 October 1941 fron hrny Head
quarters V7ith the subject "lioasures taken by tho Einsatz-
koi'-inando v;ith tho 22nd Infantry Division" and addrossod
to the Einsatzr:ruppo D, tho follov/inr; directives
"Tho EinsatzkoiTaaudo of tho Security
Police with tho 22nd Infantry Division
is in tho cenbat area of tho Division.
It is expected that all r.ve^suros in
tho town of Genitschok, ospociall-y public
executions, sotting and-arning tho
Ulcra.inian Hoi.io Guard, etc., will only be
taken after previous agrjonont with tho
Ic of the Divisiono"
Tills is signed by tho :^0K, Chief of Staff, initialed
by Rioson and evidently bearing another initial "R", a
Hajor of the General Staff Corps. This directive to the
Einsatzgruppon is also shown in Exhibit S71,
Certainly those orders as to tho location of Einsazt-
gruppo units wore not such basic orders as can bo charged
to the cor.raandor-in-chiof, but would clearly be v/ithin
the sphere of authority of a. chlof of staff.
For the reasons heroin stated, and on tho whole record,
wo find tho dofondant guilty undor Counts Two and Throe
of the Indlctnont.
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Hiidolf Lehmcvnn was born in 1890 r.t Posen* After
prelimlno.ry education, he studied law and received his
doctor *s degree in 1920 at Ilarburg. Kls practice, how
ever, v/as interrupted by the first World V/ar in which he
participated'as an officer in the Heserve. From then on he
followed the career of jv.rist in various capacities.
In 1925 he became an assistant In the Reich Ministry
of Justice and continued in the hiniatry in various capacities
until 1937. In that year he became presiding
Judge at the newly created Reich Armed Forces Court which
WO.S the hignest military court in the German Reich, He
sat on the Tribunal which was appointed by Hitler to
Investigate the charges against General P'reiherr von
Fritsch. He testified that he drew up the verdict in
this case. On 15 July 1938 he became Chief of the Legal
Department of the OKW, designated in the docximents as
V/R, which position he held until the capitxilation of
Germany. He held this position as a civil servant. On
1 Hay 1944 he was given the militar:/ title of Generalober-
stabsrichter wliich was in fact a General l.n the German -Irmy
vdiich corresponds to that of a Lieutenant General in the
Army of the United States, lie v/as not a member of the
Has! Party or any of its formations. The record does
not establish that- any honors v/ere conferred upon him by
the Hazi party.
Aside from the charge of Crimes ii.gainst Peace, hereto
fore disposed of ;in this opinion, we thinlc that charges
under Coimts Two and Three of the Indictment may be disposed
of under the follov/ing headings s (.1) The Comnl®ar Orders
(.2) The Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order; (3) The Coianando
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Order; (U) Night and Fog Decree; (5) Terror and Sabotage
Decrees, These subjects 'vfill be discussed in-the order
heroin designated.
1. The Commissar Order.
The only connection •Wii:..ch- the defendant is shown to
have b.ad v/ith the issuance of the ComiT.issar Order was an
iiruiiaterial change in the wording of Section 3 as to courts-
••nartial and the Tribimal is unable to find from the
evidence any criminal connection of the defendant Lehmann
vrith the issuance of tins order.
The Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order.
In this Judgment vfe have previously discussed the
legality of the Barbarossa Jorisdiction Ordur and have
found xt to have constituted an illegal order. The
quest:' on now ain.s.-s -.s io tl:c criiainal ccnnection of the
deion'ant Leh:nar.n th^re^iLth.
The deiondant lehnann first received an or.ler con
cerning this matier sometime in late Apr-1 of 19Ul. The
early stages of the dovej-op-ent of the or -\.r are shrouded
in .-bsourity as far as the^'- appear in the documents In
evidenceo The tofondant Lehj-iann^ I'.n his test^^mcny, has
given a rath-r claborato state.-ent as to what those
ucvGlopncnts were and his Cv.-v\Gcti ns there7/ith, ue shall
not go -nto thuse earl.y developm.ents extensively. From
his tGsti:mony it would ap jear that the circumstances of
the order as curamunicatod to him by Keitel's adjutant
so aroused him that he drew an'impracticable or';.;er to the
affect t -at legal offxcers v/ould be dispensed with in the
Ger:'an 'W'ehjri.iacht am. sent into combat service, iiccording
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Ito his tostimony/ his roc.ction to the commimicc.tion he
rGcoivod was prinip.rily based upon the offoct of tho
ordor u-Don military Jurisdiction,
Tho Earbarossa Jurisdiction Orderwhioh-v/aa. finally pro
duced is an excellent exaiiiple of tho fundamental and
assontio-l functions which a staff performs in producing
a military order from an original idea. The record dis-
closos conferonces, telophono calls, and much corrospon-
denco, all independent of Hitler. In this way tho details
of the order wore worked out, hany of those details-
origino-tod in the minds of various staff officers and some
in the laind of tho defendant.
In summarizing the gonor~lly significant parts of
those proceedings, it is shown that on 28 April 1941, the
defendant prepared a draft of the j^arbarossa Jurisdiction
Order, Gn or c.bout 6 I.ay ho received a copy of an order
vdiich ho.d been prepared by tho 0107, a'oparontly by
General luoller, tho General for Spoclo.l Assignments with
tho OlCi, vjhlch embodied certain ideas of Oberst General
Haider, Chiof of btaff of OKH. On 9 llrx-j tho defondc.nt
reported to tho Chief, \VPSt, Eopartment L (V/arlimont)
concerning certain discussions which ho had with G-cnoral
liuoller and General Joschonnek, and also as to discus
sions v;ith tho chiefs of tho legal sections, Tho
defendant had conferences with both f^onoral iluoller and
Groneral Jeschonnok concerning this matter. As an out
growth of those activities a final and fourth draft was
sulomittod to Hoitol which, with a few minor modifications,
was issued over tho signaaburo of Aoitol P-nd became v.-hat
is ;,cnov/n as tho Barbaroasa Jurisdiction Order,
In connection v/ith these various conferonces and
r
various drafts and tho corrospondorico connected therev/lth,
It is apparent that the defendant's ideas for good or
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evil became a part of tliis order as issued. On the favorable
side as to these details it can bo said that he did not
embody in the final draft which he submitted the inflama-
tory language which was contained in the draft submitted
by the OKH. Furthermore, in his favor in this connection,
it is pointed out that that draft provided that iiehabitants
''v;ho tahe part or intend to tahe part in the hostilities
as guerillas, etc" (emphasis supplied) and that in the
defendant's final draft the words "or intend" were not
included. His final text , however, contained the
provisions as to collective punishments which left the
door wide open' to the decision of an officer of at least
the rank of a batta.lion coiimiander to ii'npose such collective
punishments as he saw fit^
This evidence also shows that due to the influence of
the defendant the provision was finally inserted in the
order to the effect that troops would dispose of all cases
and that courts were to have no jurisdiction whatsoever,
whereas General Huoller had urged that troops were to
dispose , of only those clear cases and that doaibtful cases
were to be left to the jurisdiction of the courts. The
defendant's comments on this mo.tter are significant -^s
shown by the document whore he statess
"The draft of the Army comes very near
to our own proposals. The only sentence
missing is the provision that the courts
of the armed foroos have no jurisdiction
at all over the indigenous inhabitants.
General Haider wished to have this
jurisdiction maintained for those cases
in which the troops have no time for
lnvestlrT..tiona and for the largo number
of orfonses of minor kands in which^
execution by shooting is not jvi.stified.
I have objections to this, shared by
General Jeschonnek.
"Once we take this step, we must take
it fully. Otherwise it is to be feared
386
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that the troops v/ill get rid just of-
those cases v/hich they consider awlavard,
nanely the doubtful cases'by handing them
over to the courts. Thus, the outcome
will be contrary to the result v;e aim
at'*.
In this decision his position was approved by the
defendant VJarlimont as is shown by the same page of the
docuraent. This provision in "the order, v;hich obviously
v/as not derived from Hitler or Heitel or Jodl, is one
of the most vicious parts of the order. The defendant's •
reasons for this provision appear from the documents
and his own testimony to have been that in the event such
cases were handed over to the courts, the courts wouild
acoiuit the defendants for lack of evidencej that those
acquittals v/ould bring upon the military courts criticism
by Hitler to the effect there v/ore too lenient, as he
had done with reference to certain decisions made
during the Polish campaign. In other words, it is
apparent that. In order to avoid criticism of military
courts by the Fuehrer, he was ready to sacrifice the
lives of innocent people.
The discussions about the disciplinary features of
this order also shov/ the part that a staff officer
plays in the final structure of an order. The net
rosuilt of the entire proceedings as to this order was
that Lohrnann became the main factor in determining the
final form into which the criminal ideas of Hitler vrere
pu.tl that ho modified those ideas within his'ov/n
sphere up to a certain point and placed the v/Iiole into
an effective military order which v/as transmitted to
the troops and carried out.
Under the record, we find hin responsible for
criminal connection v;ith, participation in, and formulation
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3, The Commando Order.
The Commando Order is another example of the part
a staff officer plays in the final structure of a
military order. Like the preceding Barho-rossa Juris
diction Order, it cannot ho said that the whole of the
Commando Order, or the major part of it, is a product of
one man^s mind. V/e are not concerned v/ith the question
of determining just hov; far the ideas of any one man
are embodied in these orders except insofar as ideas
that can be traced to a given defendant show his own
state of mind in contributing criminal parts to the
criminal whole. The basic criminal offense is in the
essential part a staff officer performs in making
effective the criminal whole.
This was a criminal order in "vvhich the defendant
ViTarllmont, as has been pointed out, was a major factor
and the-defendant Lehmann's activities 'were subordinate
to a largo extent. The defendant was v/all av/are of the
criminal nature of this order. This had been pointed,
out by Admiral Canaris in various telegrams. v;ith which
he was fa.miliar. Ho made certain suggestions as to
methods . which . • might, by a strained construction,
" glvo some appearance of legality and be s\.iitablG
for publication; constructions which h^ apparently did
not believe himself.
We find no provisions In this order whore he con
tributed to its Inherent vlciousnoss but he v/qs one
of those responsible for its final production in the
form in v/hich this criminal order was transmitted to
the army and he was criminally responsible for a part
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of the vicious product
4« The Night r.nd Fog Decreo,
The Night and Fog Decroe basically involved legal
questions, and in this, as in tho Barbarossa Jurisdiction
Order, the defendant Lehinann was the major craftsman of
its final form. It was the defendant Lohmann vdio conducted
the negotiations whereby the Ilinistry of Justice v/as
given the task of trying those persons charged under
this decree before the Special and, later, the People*s
Courts, wherein they were deprived of tho rudimentary
rights v;hich defendants have in the courts of any
civilized nation.
His defense as to this charge is not v/ithou.t some
merit, in that it was apparently the original idea of
Hitler that those unfortunates were to be turned over to
tho tender mercies of the police for disposition. But
for the reason stated above, we find him guilty as a
•oarticioant of tho final production of this terror program#
5* Terror and Sabotage Decrees,
On 1 July 1944 from V/FSt, gu. Section, Leiimann
rocoived tho following communication
"Subject: Corabatting of enemy terrorists
in the occuniod territories.
"On acxiount of events in Coponhagen,
the Fuehrer has decreed that court martial
proooedinga against civilians in tho^
occupied territorios must bo discontinued
with ir.iLiediate effect, aR is requested to
submit suggestions for the draft of an
order concerning the treatment of enemy
terrorists and saboteurs among the
civilian population in the occupied
territories by 2 July, 20:00 hours.
"Policies :
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''TGrror cr.n bo countorod only "by
ternor, but court-m^r.rtial sontences only
create I'l'^rtTrs and national horoes.
"if Geri'.ian units or individual-
soldiors arc attacl:ed in any manner, tho
commandGr of the unit and/or the indivi
dual soldier are bound to tako countor-
liioasures independently and, in particulax"
exterminato terrorists, lerrorists
oi" saboteurs v/ho ore arrested later,
^ust be turned over to tho 3D»"
with this diroctivo hoforo him, he proceeded to
males ciiectlvQ tho illoG"! desires of his superiors,
which apparently bore fruit in the Terror and Sabotage
Docrso of oO July 1944.^ signed- hy Hitler, in August
1944, apparently in conjunction with the quartermaster
gootion Of the oicvY, he particip"ted'in tho supplomontal
„,,cior enlarging the scooo o^ the original decree. Ho
vras thereafter ^ capacity connected with both
tho order and the sunolomontal directives.
On the
'•'htters above notod and on tho record, wo
a
and Three of t^ ^ ^^ho indictBcnt
find the dofen^^^^^ guHV ®dor Comrts Two
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®®lligerents and Pris' es
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^^dictment.
s £
Hermann
V^alter
Friedrt°^
pity: Crimea against Civilians) of the
Georg Karl
von KIBCHL--.1/1^
Hans von SALH^TH
Karl von
Hermann BOTH
Hans
Otto v/OEBLilH
Hudolf LEHBI/ilBT
Karl HOLLIDT
ViTilhelm von
Hugo SPBHiiLB
Otto schitiswibd
11 T 3 II C E S
i®prisonment
imprisonment
years imprisonment
20 yeans imprisonment
20 years imprisonment
dd years imprisonment
is years imprisonment
d years imprisonment
*7 years imprisonment
^ years imprisonment
3 years imprisonment
acquitted
acquitted
Each defendant reoeivins ^ sentence for a term of years
shall receive credit uoon the sentence imposed upon him for
such a period or periods of time as he has been in confinement.
whether as a prisoner of war or otherwise, since 7 Hay 1945.
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GSRMAH HIGH C0IvII\L4HD TRIAL
(Case XII)
C Count I (Crimes against Peace) and Count IV (Common Plan
or Conspiracy) of the Indictment were rejected by IT.S. Military
Tribunal V. All defendants, with the exception of SCHIUB'VFJD
and SPEKuLE (who were acquitted) and von LEEB (who was found
guilty on Count III only), were found guilty under Count II
(War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: Crimes against Enemy
Belligerents and Prisoners of War) and Count III (War Crimes
and Crimes against Humanity: Crimes against Civilians) of the
Indictment.
S jc IT T L IT c L S
Hermann REIHICICE
V7alter V'/AHLIi^OHT
Georg Karl FriedricH
von KULCHLLn
Hans von SALHUTH
Karl von ROQ.tJES
Hermann HOTH
Hans HEinH/iuDT
Otto i/OEHLlXi
Rudolf LEHr.L4H]T
Karl HOLLIDT
VTilhelm von LELB
Hugo SPERivLE
Otto SCHNIEXIUD
life imprisonment
life imprisonment
20 years imprisonment
20 years imprisonment
20 years imprisonment
15 years imprisonment
15 years imprisonment
years imprisonment
7 years imprisonment
5 years imprisonment
3 years imprisonment
acquitted
acquitted
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